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We present findings from a case study on California’s higher education sector that explores the
relationships between public policy, state contexts, and higher education performance over the past two
decades (2000–2020). Through the collection of primary and secondary data, including interviews with
16 policymakers, education policy leaders, and researchers inside and outside of California, we document
the development, manifestation, and implications of three primary faultlines: (a) Persistent disparities by
race, socioeconomic status, and geography that combine to sharply limit individual educational and
economic opportunity for many within the state. Any measure of performance in higher education must
address how higher education closes these disparities relative to the magnitude of the disparities in the
population. (b) Fragmentation, or the policy-related phenomena and structures that contribute to a lack of
alignment and synchronicity in the statewide approach to postsecondary education. (c) Volatility, or
extreme variations and unpredictability in state and local funding for higher education, with impacts that
extend into institutional resource allocations and family budgets. Our case study documents a need for
sustained state policy leadership in higher education or sustained public stewardship of higher education.
Year-over-year, session-by-session, and sector-by-sector agreements fall short in addressing the deep
faultlines outlined in this report. We make several recommendations for how public policy can begin to
address these issues and better meet the needs of the state’s populous.
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FOREWORD
Joni E. Finney, PhD
In January 2020, several doctoral and master’s degree students from the University of Pennsylvania
initiated a study of public policy and higher education through an advanced course in public policy.
At the end of the semester, which concluded virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic, these
same students expanded and developed a full case of California higher education through
November 2020. As their former professor, I was pleased to continue the work with them. We
were guided by an overarching question: What public policies help us understand the performance
of higher education in California? This adds to research on other states, including Illinois, Georgia,
Maryland, Texas, Tennessee, and Washington. Some of this work is documented in The Attainment
Agenda published in 2014 with coauthor Laura Perna. Other work was under the auspices of the
Institute for Research on Higher Education at the University of Pennsylvania, which I directed
from 2008 to 2020.
Of course, from the initiation of this work in January 2020 to its release in December 2020, the
world changed. The pandemic from the novel coronavirus, the ensuing recession, and national
unrest due to heightened injustice collided to change conversations about racial inequalities,
individual opportunity, and economic recovery. These realities could not be ignored as we went
about our work to understand how state policy influences higher education in California. The data
and analyses we reviewed, the research that we drew on, and the individuals that we interviewed
shaped our ideas and understanding not only of the national importance of higher education in
California – simply due to its sheer size – but also the diverse, vibrant young and adult populations
that the state should serve through higher education. California is experiencing this change on a
scale that many other states are only beginning to understand. In this very real sense, California,
with all its complexities, opportunities, and challenges, may be the harbinger of change for the
larger national higher education landscape.
As we dove deeper into our research and shared insights, we came to understand that the system
of public higher education in California is performing just as elected officials expect. It was
designed to educate a limited population because, at the time, most Californians did not require
education and training beyond high school in order to find good jobs. In 1960, it would have been
hard to imagine the growth and diversity that the state would face and the changes brought about
by an information economy. The context of today’s population was likely unimaginable in 1960. In
our research we found that three “faultlines” helped us understand how policy influences
performance in California. Educational disparities by race, income and place are well documented.
They cross areas of K-12 preparation, college participation, and completion and affordability.
Secondly the fragmentation of public policy at every level influences institutional expectations and
performance. Finally, the volatility of public funding has consequences for long-term state and
institutional planning but also wreaks havoc on family budgets.
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What we found in California is a system of higher education that underperforms relative to its
needs for a thriving future workforce and for a more equitable society. The system that Californians
often refer to as “the best in the world” is at risk of increasing educational disparities among its
peoples and their opportunities. We believe that the challenges that the state is trying to address
are unlikely to be resolved within the governance and finance policies that have been the bedrock of
higher education since the inception of the California Master Plan for Higher Education in 1960.
While it is easy to point fingers, we understand the difficulty of reforming a mature system that has
experienced international acclaim and success. We offer recommendations to contribute to the
conversation about how California might undertake a process that would result in sustained public
policy leadership for higher education for decades to come. Fundamentally, the challenge is one that
the state must address, as it did in 1960. We are also painfully aware that the challenges of the global
pandemic, the ravaging of California forests and homes by climate change, and the very serious
problems of homelessness makes it difficult for the state to focus on higher education. But we are
optimistic that higher education can be one of the state’s strategic assets in addressing these challenges while simultaneously serving as a tool to reduce disparity and increase individual opportunity
for the nearly 40 million people who call the state their home.
The authors welcome the reactions of readers to this report.

“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA

2

INTRODUCTION
Taylor K. Odle
Like much of the nation, California faces a series of cascading crises, including an unprecedented
pandemic, an impending economic recession, and large social movements for equity and justice
while also battling the harsh effects of climate change. Postsecondary education can play a key
role in addressing such problems by advancing research and policy, driving economic and workforce development, and promoting social and democratic ideals. But California faces these
cascading crises along with other pronounced challenges in its postsecondary sector, including
the rapid diversification of its youth and adult populations, a projected decline in the number of
high school graduates, and a pressing need to credential more workers for the modern
economy (including those previously not served well by traditional forms of higher education).
These contexts and harsh realities make this a pivotal time for higher education in California,
where a challenge-ridden and constrained system must once again work to advance state goals.
How the state and its leaders respond to these challenges will have lasting impacts on the
sector and state at large for generations to come. To inform these actions, this case study
documents the development and manifestation of a series of interrelated challenges facing
California’s system of higher education, with a focus on how public policy can simultaneously be
used to address them and to advance a shared public agenda for higher education.
Big problems are not new to California. In the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, the state faced what were
then thought to be insurmountable challenges, including an expected “tidal wave” of students
following World War II, the Civil Rights and Free Speech social movements on its campuses, and
a disconnected system of universities, where students faced unclear paths from community
colleges to four-year institutions. The state once again faces big problems, but big problems will
bend to public policy—just as they have before. University of California President Clark Kerr
and Governor Pat Brown used the California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960 to
overcome many of the challenges of the mid-twentieth century, including by developing a
sensible division of labor among the state’s institutions, allowing a way for the systems to
support democratic values and populist ideals (balancing access with excellence), and addressing
systemic issues inherent in the sector’s operation. This Master Plan led California into the
twenty-first century and shaped one of the most prestigious public systems of higher education
in the world. Today, nearly all aspects of the state’s demography, workforce, and economy have
changed dramatically. This means the solutions to today’s problems must be different than the
solutions proposed more than 60 years ago.
The Master Plan of 1960 is still in effect today, but its utility has been greatly diminished. What
remains is a structural division of labor between systems. What has eroded are critical features,
including a guide on where to place campuses given demographic changes and a commitment to
providing access to education for all who could benefit. Even with regular “updates” across four
official Joint Committee reviews since the 1970s, few meaningful revisions have been made to
the Master Plan, and it has become outdated and ill-suited to reflect California’s rapidly evolving
“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA
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context in order to be a strategic asset to the state’s future prosperity and social well-being.
The few features that have been updated include some duplication of academic programs,
acknowledging the state’s growing diversity, and an affirmation of the state’s goals of workforce
preparation, accountability, and efficiency, but even these changes fall short of the state’s need
to coherently guide a complex system of higher education for the decades to come. Simply put,
the Plan has outlived is public purpose. Even the title of the Master Plan makes clear that it was
meant to guide the state only through 1975, not into the twenty-first century and beyond. As
such, it was unable to anticipate the host of changes in the state since its adoption, including a
more diverse populous requiring access to different levels and types of education; a sharp
development of regionalism and its salience in economics, politics, and society; the escalated
role of the workforce and the inextricable link between higher education and workforce
development; the growing salience of attaining some education and training beyond high school
for individual opportunity; and the increased complexity of the decision-making process given
California’s public referenda (or “direct democracy”) process.
While California may not necessarily need a new Master Plan, it does need a mechanism to
support sustained public policy leadership for higher education that is reflective of the state’s
new contexts and responsive to the needs of its populous. The state needs a process,
mechanism, or entity to transcend gubernatorial and legislative terms, to leverage its
postsecondary sector as a strategic asset for state economic and workforce goals, and to chart
a path to a future for a very different California than the one of mid-1900s. Yet, in the absence
of a steward to sustain and fuel a public agenda for California, the 60-year-old Master Plan
continues to guide higher education policy in the state, and California’s continued operation
under principles instilled by the 1960 Master Plan have come to produce negative effects on the
sector and its performance. In fact, as detailed in this report, the Master Plan reinforces values
today that, while once beneficial, jeopardize the state’s ability to meet its educational and labormarket goals. For example, the strong division of labor and mission between sectors that once
provided clean and clear roles for institutions has created lasting divides between sectors that
have solidified the state’s siloed higher education system and led to policy misalignment, both of
which ultimately harm the state’s ability to address fundamental issues of access and success.
The lack of sustained higher education policy leadership or ongoing state policy stewardship to
represent the public interest in higher education has deepened a series of “faultlines,” a
collection of contextual and structural challenges that separate the state, its institutions, and its
people. These faultlines are the result of the collision of changing contexts (demographic,
economic, geographic, political, and social) and the lack of a mechanism for sustained public
policy stewardship that would link far more Californians to educational opportunities beyond
high school, establish a direct connection with the workforce and regional economic
development opportunities, and diminish the gaps in disparities among groups that so prevalent
in the state.
In what follows, we present findings from a case study on California’s higher education sector
that explores the relationships between public policy, state contexts, and higher education
performance over the past two decades. Through the collection of primary and secondary data,
including interviews with 16 policymakers, education policy leaders, and researchers inside and
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outside of California, we document the development, manifestation, and implications of three
primary faultlines.
1. Persistent disparities by race, socioeconomic status, and geography that combine to
sharply limit individual educational and economic opportunity for many within the state.
Any measure of performance in higher education must address how higher education
closes these disparities relative to the magnitude of the disparities in the population.
2. Fragmentation, a term we use to describe the policy-related phenomena and
structures that contribute to a lack of alignment and synchronicity in the statewide
approach to postsecondary education.
3. Volatility, or extreme variations and unpredictability in state and local funding for
higher education, with impacts that extend into institutional resource allocations and
family budgets.
Capacity constraints—real and perceived limitations on state and sector political, fiscal, and
physical resources—traverse each of these interconnected faultlines. Our research suggests
that these faultlines have not only shaped the mediocrity in higher education performance that
California has grown accustomed to in recent years (detailed in this report) but also make the
state and its institutions especially susceptible to internal and external shocks, like COVID-19,
climate change, homelessness, and economic downturns. While these faultlines have emerged
and deepened over time, none have been systematically addressed through public policy. As we
show, this lack of action has consequences.
California possesses unparalleled prominence given its position as a “nation state,” its economic
power, its growing diversity of people, and its history of social and public policy leadership. But
these faultlines and a lack of sustained public stewardship for the higher education have left the
state with suboptimal postsecondary success across many contexts. California has enjoyed
strong performance on many traditional indicators thanks in part to the Master Plan, but this
performance has seldom been to the level expected of a nation state. With notable deficiencies
and a lack of excellence on standard measures of college preparation, access, attainment, and
affordability detailed later in this report, the state finds itself with widening gaps in opportunity
and ceding its top-ranked national position to other states. This suboptimal performance is
insufficient for the state to meet growing economic and workforce demands—particularly given
the fact that California has long lacked a link between higher education performance and
workforce competitiveness. It is also inexcusable for the most diverse state in the nation to fail
in providing the same public stewardship it once provided to students and families after WWII.
A forward-thinking approach to public policy and a sustained mechanism for implementing these
policies must work to serve the future populous and future economy.
California’s rapid diversification means the state and its educational pipeline—from college
preparation and high school graduation through postsecondary enrollment and completion—
must sharply expand access and success among groups traditionally underserved by higher
education. Persistent disparities between those who enroll in higher education and the
population as a whole translate into unequal levels of educational attainment across dimensions
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of race, socioeconomic status, and place, which in turn directly impact individuals’ social
mobility and economic prosperity. These disparities have, in part, led California to have one of
the highest rates of income inequality in the nation. Without a public steward, California’s
ability to address these issues has been limited. The state houses a fragmented system where
gubernatorial and legislative leaders engage with higher education policy without systematically
considering the changed context of the state. This discontinuity in leadership combines with the
siloed structure of the three systems of higher education and weak or nonexistent
accountability measures to hamstring the state’s ability to make concerted and coordinated
progress toward reducing educational disparities and meeting workforce needs. This inability is
further limited by exceedingly high volatility in state resources and education appropriations,
which translate to unpredictable increases in tuition and fees—further widening disparities
across individuals and institutional contexts.
If California does not remedy its faultlines, the state’s higher education performance, and
related state competitiveness, is at risk. COVID-19 and the oncoming recession may be the first
test of the extent and severity of shocks to California’s faultlines. While our research began
before the pandemic began, COVID-19 has undoubtedly deepened these faultlines by increasing
volatility in state and family resources, widening disparities among the population, and
contributing to misalignment between the needs of the state and its ability to meet these needs
with sustained fiscal and political responses. COVID-19, the economic recession, and racial
injustice present an opportunity for systematic action within California’s higher education
system. With new leadership at the helm of each system (including a new University of
California president, a new California State University chancellor, and the installment of the
new California Community Colleges chancellor in 2016), this is undoubtedly a pivotal time for
the state’s higher education system. In this opportune time, the state must “get to work” and
consider whether some of its prevailing higher education policies or operations are suited for
the state’s populous and economy. The challenges the state and its leaders face are, again,
different than those faced by Clark Kerr, but they are not impossible to overcome. There is
extreme difficulty in changing mature systems, but today’s leaders can learn from Kerr’s
willingness to confront reality. With bold leadership, California must confront this new reality
by abandoning the “Band-Aid” solutions that have been placed across these faultlines over the
past few decades, and retrofitting its higher education infrastructure (financially, politically, and
organizationally) to meet new needs and prepare for the ever-present threat of more shocks.
California’s problems are fundamentally state issues. The state must engage a wide range of
stakeholders that represent California and plan for the future stewardship of higher education.
Statewide educational needs that go unaddressed must be at the top of the public agenda. As
noted, this public policy leadership need not look like a new Master Plan per se, but systemic
and sustained work on these faultlines must be a priority. The higher education sector alone
cannot solve these, nor was it designed for that purpose. Recent efforts, including the
Governor’s Council on Postsecondary Education and the California Postsecondary Education
Recovery with Equity Taskforce, are important and positive steps that are likely to result in
some improvement, but they are fundamentally short term in nature and unlikely to address the
fundamentally fragmented and volatile funding policies that sustain them.

“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA

6

Our case study documents a need for sustained state policy leadership in higher education and
sustained public stewardship of higher education. Public stewardship of higher education has
taken many forms across the nation, but sustained leadership across gubernatorial and
legislative terms is key. Year-over-year, session-by-session, and sector-by-sector agreements fall
short in addressing the deep faultlines outlined in this report. While California enjoys and
benefits from a rich diversity and strong bench of public policy advocacy and education research
organizations, these organizations cannot change the law—and cannot substitute for sustained
state policy leadership. What is needed is not the action of one governor or one legislature but
rather a sustained change in the way higher education policy is carried out.
In the following chapters, we present the findings from our case study with emphasis on
documenting the development, manifestation, and implications of California’s faultlines. Each
chapter features an analysis of primary and secondary data, including insights and quotes from
internal state stakeholders and external policy and research leaders. In A Nation State, Maya
Kaul and Melissa Bodnar provide important contextual information on the state to situate the
case study, including information on the state’s population, geography, economy, workforce,
political context, and higher education landscape. In Disparities: Compounding Faultlines in
California’s Foundation, Melissa Bodnar documents how educational and economic opportunities
in the state are sharply drawn along dimensions of race, socioeconomic status, and place. In
Surveying Fragmentation in California’s Higher Education Policy Landscape, Elizabeth Dunens and
Maya Kaul document how California’s political process, insufficient higher education policy
leadership, and structural organization of the higher education sector have developed deep
divides across the state and limited its ability to comprehensively respond to policy needs. In
Uncertain and Volatile State Funding, Pooja R. Patel and Lindsay Adams Van Ostenbridge map the
presence and growth of volatility in state and local financial support for higher education,
including how public policies have exacerbated these trends and what implications they hold for
institutional budgets and family finances. Joni Finney and I conclude the case study with Policy
Implications & Recommendations, a reflection on these faultlines and how public policy may begin
to address these issues and better meet the needs of the state’s populous.
If California is to remedy its faultlines, it must reconsider how it approaches higher education
policy leadership and prioritize reducing persistent gaps in educational attainment and economic
opportunity along dimensions of race, socioeconomic status, and place. The state must leverage
its higher education system as a strategic asset; a mechanism with the ability to improve
individual opportunity and expand the state’s economic competitiveness. If we allow these
faultlines to deepen, the link between higher education and a host of individual, social, and
economic disparities will only become stronger; in other words, the strategic asset of higher
education could come to reinforce the very disparities it hopes to eliminate. Without a
mechanism to guard against this liability and to holistically ensure that California’s higher
education sector works for the state and its people, the state’s politically and regionally
fragmented structure, and growing financial constraints on public funds for postsecondary
institutions all but ensure the state cannot meaningfully improve its higher education
performance, the individual prosperity of its citizens, or the economic competitiveness of its
workforce. To avoid such outcomes, we recommend that California (1) establish a substantive
statewide policy agenda that includes a regional approach to higher education; (2) convene a
diverse and representative blue ribbon commission to holistically consider the state’s long-term
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higher education needs; and (3) evaluate how the state’s political, structural, fiscal, and
operational approach to higher education could be better formed to meet the needs of its
future populous and workforce. These steps will place California on a trajectory to recreate a
system of higher education that meets the needs of contemporary life while also positioning it
for success in the decades to come.
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A NATION STATE: THE CONTEXT OF CALIFORNIA
Maya Kaul & Melissa Bodnar, with contributions from Yulanda Essoka
x

California is the most populous state in the United States. It has been aging and has
become increasingly racially and ethnically diverse over the last three decades, becoming a
majority-minority state in 2014.

x

Given the geographic scale and diversity of the state, a regional policy analysis is necessary
to address workforce and education needs.

x

The GDP of California rivals that of small nations; however, the state’s economy has been
seriously hit by the economic recession brought on by COVID-19, and income inequality
persists across the state.

x

The expansion of the state’s workforce is threatened by higher education failing to keep
pace with the economy’s rapidly changing needs.

x

California is a direct democracy state with a ballot initiative system.

x

The bedrock of California’s higher education system is the California Master Plan for
Higher Education of 1960, a strategic vision for the state that continues to guide the
higher education system today.

x

The vast majority of the state’s 2.4 million students seeking an associate’s degree or
higher are enrolled in the public sector—in the University of California, the California
State University, and the California Community Colleges systems.

“When you have a state that’s larger than the populations of 21 plus states combined, it gives you a
sense of the magnitude and scale of the nation’s largest state, the world’s fifth largest economy, the
most diverse state, and the world’s most diverse democracy—over 27% of us foreign-born. […] It’s a
point of pride and spirit that California has for decades seen itself in that light as our nation’s largest
state, with all the power and potential it has—all the resource’s that reside within it: more scientists,
more researchers, more Nobel laureates, more patents, more venture capital than any other place in
the globe, the finest system of public higher education anywhere in the world.”
- Governor Gavin Newsom, April 20201
In the historic words of journalist Carey McWilliams, California is “the great exception.”2 The
state is home to three of the nation’s largest cities—Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Jose—and
its local industries (e.g., technology, entertainment, agriculture) make the state a central player
in both national and globalized economies. As the nation’s first large minority-majority state,3
California is distinctive not only in its size but also in its diversity. In this light, California has for
many years seen itself as a model for the rest of the nation; however, the state faces persistent
challenges in ensuring its citizens achieve what Governor Newsom has dubbed the “California
1

Office of the Governor of California, Twitter post, April 2020, 11:55 a.m., https://twitter.com/CAgovernor/status/1249773282309468165/.
Carey McWilliams, The Great Exception (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999).
3
Peter Schrag, California: America’s High-stakes Experiment (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 2.
2
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dream.”4 Higher education has the potential to serve as a key strategic asset to the state in
moving towards that dream. Understanding the particularities of the Californian context—
including its people, landscape, economy, politics, however, is necessary before one can grapple
with the interplay between public policy and the state’s higher education system. In this chapter,
we provide a brief overview of this context, with special attention to dynamics that have
historically influenced the state’s higher education system.
The People
California has experienced substantial population growth over the years. In fact, “no other
developed region of similar size anywhere in the world has sustained so much growth over
such a long period” as California.5 From 1920 to 2010, California’s population grew by roughly
936%, from approximately 3.6 million to 37.3 million.6 The most populous state in the United
States, California’s population topped 39.5 million in 2019.7
While the state’s population gains are projected to continue well into the future, the rate of
that growth is slowing considerably. Between 2020 and 2060, the state’s population is projected
to grow by roughly 5.2 million people, a total rate of growth of 12.9% over a forty-year span, or
roughly 0.32% per year.8 Examining a comparable and earlier period of time, the state’s
population grew by 17.3 million people from 1970 to 2010, a total growth rate of 87%, or
2.18% growth per year.9 As the data suggest, population growth in California will continue, but
at a significantly slower rate in the coming years. This slowed rate of growth will mirror
population growth trends for the nation as a whole.10 Between 2017 and 2060, the United
States’ population is expected to grow at a rate of roughly 0.66%, or 2.1 million people, per
year.11
Even as population growth slows, California is becoming more diverse. In 1990, California was a
majority White (57.2%) state (Figure 1).12 Hispanics were the second largest racial/ethnic group
at that time, comprising 25.8% of the state’s population, followed by Asian and Pacific Islanders
(9.6%), African Americans (7.4%), and American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts (0.8%).13 However,
California became a majority-minority state in 2014,14 with no single race or ethnic group
comprising the majority of its population. While this remains true today, Latinos have officially
surpassed Whites as the largest racial/ethnic group in the state (Figure 1). According to the U.S.

4

Kathleen Ronayne, “Gov. Newsom Points to California Exceptionalism, Challenges,” AP NEWS, January 8, 2019,
https://apnews.com/article/6083cff250d546469dd6007ac20a1f05.
5
“Population,” Public Policy Institute of California, January 2016, 1. https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_116HJ3R.pdf .
6
Author calculation, “E-7, California Population Estimates, with Components of Change and Crude Rates, July 1, 1900-2019,” [Data set] State of
California Department of Finance, 2019.
7
“U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: California,” Census Bureau QuickFacts, 2019, accessed January 2020, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA.
8
Author calculation, “P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined” [Data set], State of California
Department of Finance, 2019.
9
“E-7, California Population Estimates, with Components of Change and Crude Rates, July 1, 1900-2019,” [Data set] State of California
Department of Finance, 2019.
10
Jonathan Vespa, Lauren Medina, and David Armstrong, “Demographic Turning Points for the United States: Population Projections for 2020
to 2060,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2018, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.pdf.
11
Ibid.
12
Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to
1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2002,
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2002/demo/POP-twps0056.pdf.
13
Ibid.
14
Mark Hugo Lopez and Jens Manuel Krogstad, “Will California Ever Become a Majority-Latino State? Maybe Not,” Pew Research Center
FactTank, May 30, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/04/will-california-ever-become-a-majority-latino-state-maybe-not/.
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Census Bureau,15 approximately 39.4% of Californians are Hispanic or Latino, 36.5% are White,
15.5% are Asian, 6.5% are African American, 1.6% are American Indian and Alaska Native, and
0.5% are Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander. As these numbers suggest, Latinos, American
Indians/Alaska Natives, and Asians have grown in their total share of California’s total
population since 1990, while representation among Whites and African Americans in the state
has fallen.16
Figure 1. Racial/Ethnic Composition of California, 1990 and 2019
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Sources: Gibson & Jung, 200217; U.S. Census Bureau, 2019.18
Long-range projections suggest that growth in racial and ethnic diversity in California will be
sustained over the course of the next forty years, even as the rate of population growth slows.
The White population in California is shrinking and will continue to do so through 2060.19 In
contrast, the state will experience substantial growth among Asians and Hispanics, with
marginal gains among African Americans and American Indians/Alaska Natives.20 Far from a
monolithic group, California’s Asian population encompasses people with many distinctive
regional and ethnic backgrounds.21 By 2060, it is estimated that Asians, comprised of roughly 20
15

“U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: California,” Census Bureau QuickFacts, 2019, accessed July 2020, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA.
Variation between “Hispanic” and “Latino” reflects differentiations in reporting between data sources.
17
Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to
1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2002,
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2002/demo/POP-twps0056.pdf.
18
“U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: California,” Census Bureau QuickFacts, 2019, accessed July 2020, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA.
19
“P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined” [Data set], State of California Department of
Finance, 2019.
20
Ibid.
21
Peter Schrag, California: America’s High-stakes Experiment (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008).
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different origin groups from across East and Southeast Asia and India,22 will account for 22% of
California’s population.23 24 The Latino population, which became the state’s largest ethnic
group in 2014, will continue to grow.25 It is estimated that Latinos will constitute nearly half, or
45.6%, of California’s total population by 2060.26 In contrast, the White population in California
will fall to just 23.5% in that same time.27
California has always looked upon diversity within its borders as a strength, inviting people of all
backgrounds to call California home. However, the driving forces of diversity within the state
have evolved. While California is home to a quarter of the foreign-born population in the
United States, the number of immigrants in the state has begun to level off.28 In the 1990s,
California’s immigrant population grew by roughly 37%, or 2.4 million people;29 however, from
2000 to 2010, growth among the state’s foreign-born population slowed to 15%, or just 1.3
million new immigrants.30 Between 2010 and 2017, that rate of growth slowed even further,
falling to just 6%—the first time in decades that California’s new immigrant population dropped
below one million people.31
Among its foreign-born population, California has also seen shifts in representation. While the
majority of California’s immigrant population has historically been born in Latin America,32 Asia
replaced Latin America as the largest source of new immigrants in the state in 2006.33 By 2015,
“almost three times as many immigrants were arriving from Asia as from Latin America, and
China had replaced Mexico as the leading country of origin.”34 This growth in the number of
foreign-born Asians entering California has helped drive the state’s overall gains in Asian
representation within its total population since 1990, as outlined above.35 36
In recent decades, undocumented immigrants have also come to represent a significant, and
important, subset of California’s total population—a new demographic group contributing to
the state’s overall population growth and diversity. Roughly 23% of California’s immigrants are

22
Gustavo Lopez, Neil G. Ruiz, and Eileen Patten, “Key Facts about Asian Americans, a Diverse and Growing Population,” Pew Research Center
FactTank, September 8, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/08/key-facts-about-asian-americans/.
23
Author calculation, “P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined” [Data set], State of California
Department of Finance, 2019.
24
The authors of this report acknowledge that a diversity of individuals comprise California’s Asian population, and recognize that Asians are
not a monolithic group. Reporting limitations at the time of this report do not allow for a comprehensive analysis of the varied and diverse
individuals that comprise the Asian population in the state.
25
Hans Johnson, Eric McGhee, and Marisol Cuellar Mejia, “California’s Population,” Public Policy Institute of California (April 2020),
https://www.ppic.org/publication/californias-population/.
26
“P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined” [Data set], State of California Department of
Finance, 2019.
27
Ibid.
28
Hans Johnson and Sergio Sanchez, “Immigrants in California,” Public Policy Institute of California, May 2019,
https://www.ppic.org/publication/immigrants-in-california.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
“Population,” Public Policy Institute of California, January 2018, https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/r-118hj2r.pdf.
34
Ibid., 2.
35
Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to
1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2002,
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2002/demo/POP-twps0056.pdf.
36
“P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined” [Data set], State of California Department of
Finance, 2019.
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undocumented.37 As a whole, the largest proportion of the undocumented immigrant
population in the United States—nearly a quarter—resides in California.38 39 In 2016, California
was home to approximately 2.2 million undocumented immigrants,40 and they comprised nearly
14.7% of the state’s total population.41 Among California’s undocumented immigrants, 69% are
of Mexican origin,42 contributing to the already high growth rate of the Latino population in the
state.43
Demographically, California is also aging (see Figure 2 on following page). From 2010 to 2060,
forecasts estimate that the largest population declines by age in California will be among those
ages 0 to 19, with only small increases among 20–49-year-olds.44 In contrast, the most
substantial population increases will occur among those aged 60 and older.45 More specifically,
between 2010 and 2060, the number of Californians 0 to19 years of age will fall by 1,361,557.46
In that same time, the number of Californians between age 60 and 100 will grow by 7,503,954.47
While the traditional college-age population, those between 20 and 29 years of age, is expected
to grow by 0.55% during that time, the pipeline of future traditional college going Californians
(0–19-year-olds) will contract, falling an estimated 13.0%.48 In contrast, the proportion of
Californians over the age of 60 will grow exponentially during that time, experiencing a 122.3%
spike in representation.49 As the numbers suggest, the share of residents reaching retirement
age in California is growing at a very fast pace, while the number of school-age youth is
declining. These trends will have important ramifications for the state’s public policy priorities
and postsecondary education moving forward.
California is not compensating for its aging population with an increase in young residents. This
is largely due to a sustained pattern of decline in the number of births in the state since the
early-1990s.50 At that time, the fertility rate in California rose to 2.5 children per family, the
highest fertility rate in the state since 1966.51
37

Hans Johnson and Sergio Sanchez, “Immigrants in California,” Public Policy Institute of California, May 2019,
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Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrants Holds Steady Since 2009,” Pew Research Center,
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Hispanic Combined” [Data set], State of California Department of Finance, 2019.
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Figure 2. Percentage Change in Population in California by Age, 2010-2060
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Source: State of California Department of Finance, Total Population by Age.52
Despite these gains in the early 1990s, the number of births in the state has fallen year-overyear, dropping to 531,285 in 2000 and to 509,979 in 2010.53 Long-range projections suggest that
the total number of births in the state will continue to fall well into the future, dropping by
13.1% between 2010 and 2040.54 According to these projections, the fertility rate in California
will reach a 50-year low of 1.50 children per family in 2040.55 This stands in stark contrast to
fertility rates nationally in the United States, which are projected to increase from 2020 to
2030, and remain constant at 1.80 through 2040.56
The Landscape
“[The] reality is that California isn’t a state. It's a collection of regions. And, they vary...enormously. The
Bay Area is so different from the Central Valley as far as population, education attainment, the
economy... It’s really important to understand those differences in California and then say, okay, a
problem in LA is really different than the problems in the Far North, in Sacramento, etc.”
- Dennis Jones, President Emeritus
National Center for Higher Education Management System57
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As the third largest state, geographically, in the United States,58 California spans 163,695 square
miles59 and comprises 58 counties.60 Forty-seven of those counties are considered to be
“mostly urban,” while eight are “mostly rural,” and three are “completely rural.”61￼
Approximately half of California’s population is concentrated in just 11 counties.62 Despite the
abundance of “mostly urban” counties in the state, however, many urban areas are situated in
close proximity to rural, less urban neighbors. In fact, many of California’s rural communities
are clustered around urban areas.63 For example, rural clusters with less population density can
be found outside of San Francisco, San Bernardino, Sacramento, Fresno, and Los Angeles.64
This variation in the distribution of California’s vast population across urban and rural areas
throughout the state underscores the need for a more granular approach when considering
California as a whole. For the purposes of this study, we rely on California Competes’
breakdown of the state into twelve distinct regions (Table 1).65
Aside from geographic variation across the state, a regional analysis of California is also
warranted within the broader context of higher education: “Since proximity is an important
factor in students’ college decisions, California’s higher education systems must coordinate and
act regionally to improve student outcomes.”66 This is especially true considering that a
statewide skills gap is expected in California, with forecasts projecting a shortfall of 1.1 million
workers with bachelor’s degrees by 2030.67 As Dennis Jones argues, California must “establish a
public agenda [for higher education] ... in ways that [are] regionally nuanced”.68 Work has
already begun to address this concern, as can be seen in such initiatives as Fresno DRIVE,69
Inland California Rising,70 and various intersegmental partnerships, including those in Long Beach
and the Inland Empire.71 However, these regional efforts must be expanded to more broadly
address the needs of California’s workforce and economy in the future.
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Table 1.
Regions
(From North to South)
North–Far North

Counties

Population

Humboldt, Lake, Mendocino, Del
Norte, Lassen, Modoc, Nevada,
Plumas, Siskiyou, Sierra, Shasta

702,906

Upper Sacramento Valley

Butte, Colusa, Glenn, Tehama,
Trinity
El Dorado, Placer, Sacramento,
Sutter, Yolo, Yuba

355,726

Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin,
Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo,
Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano,
Sonoma
Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Inyo,
Mariposa, Mono, Tuolumne

8,034,323

San Joaquin

Fresno, Kern, Kings, Madera,
Merced, San Joaquin, Stanislaus,
Tulare

4,219,489

Central Coast

Monterey, San Benito, San Luis
Obispo, Santa Barbara, Ventura

2,081,587

Inland Empire

Riverside, San Bernardino

4,581,109

Los Angeles

Los Angeles

10,162,069

Orange

Orange

3,189,883

San Diego

San Diego

3,338,661

Imperial

Imperial

182,844

Sacramento Tahoe
Bay Area

Central Sierra

2,498,369

189,687

Source: California Competes, “California Postsecondary to Prosperity Dashboard”72
The Economy
The GDP of California rivals that of nations. California is an incomparable state when examining
economic metrics to determine fiscal vitality. In 2019, the state boasted a $3.2 trillion gross
domestic product (GDP)—the estimated value of goods and services produced within the
state—due to its powerful economic engine that generates 60% more revenue than Texas.73
California has the largest GDP of any state, comprising 15% of the national economy. When
compared to global nations, California’s economy ranks fifth in the world, trailing behind
Germany and eclipsing India and the United Kingdom.74
72
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2020, https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/qgdpstate1020_0.pdf.
74
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Although California has the largest GDP of any state, it also has one of the highest state levels
of income inequality across the nation—a problem that is further exacerbated by high housing
costs. California ranks sixth nationally in terms of income inequality, with families in the top 90th
percentile earning 12.3 times more than those in the bottom 10th percentile statewide.75 This
inequality ranges across the state by region and is most concentrated in the Bay Area,76 where
housing costs are also the highest in the state. In San Francisco and Santa Clara, for example,
median home values exceed $1 million—well above the national average of around $200,000.
As such, housing prices are pushing many Californians into homelessness and others toward
less expensive regions, away from the coasts.77 As the following chapter will continue to
explore, identifying these disparities is key to understanding the parallel inequities in educational
access and opportunity in the state.
California’s diverse sectors of business and industry contribute to, and sustain, the state’s
economic growth. California’s broad-based industrial sector does not foster reliance on the
performance of one or a few industries. Hence, after the Great Recession California
experienced an unprecedented 118 months of economic growth.78 Although California is
known for its technology industries, the state offers wide-ranging job opportunities. Based on
Employment Development Department data, California’s industries today are led by education
and health services; professional and business services; and leisure and hospitality/food
services.79 This represents a shift from almost 20 years ago, when the financial services sector
led the state’s economy by a margin of almost two to one, and manufacturing was the second
largest sector, followed by government.80
California’s fast-growing economy is fueled by its skilled workforce; however, the expansion of the state’s
workforce is threatened by higher education failing to keep pace with the economy’s rapidly changing
needs. Although the Master Plan—the grounding document of the state’s higher education
system—focused on developing an “educated citizenry,” it did not explicitly address workforce
development.81 Yet, maintaining a skilled population that is responsive to the shifting workforce
needs in the state is foundational to sustaining a healthy and productive economy. According to
the College Futures Foundation:
By 2030, California is projected to have a shortfall of nearly 1.8 million workers. About
59 percent of that gap represents the need for workers with bachelor’s degrees, and
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“Just the Facts: California’s Economy,” Public Policy Institute of California, October 2004,
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another 9 percent is for workers with graduate degrees. Employees with an associate
degree or some college education make up the remainder of the shortfall.82
If the state is to sustain its economic productivity, this “perennial tension” between what the
economy needs and what higher education offers must be resolved.83 Increased degree
attainment is only one piece of the puzzle, however; the state also needs to work towards
producing the types of degrees relevant to burgeoning workforce needs across the state. Given
the significant regional diversity of the state, identifying which credentials are necessary to
support the economy can be a regionally specific question. Recognizing this need, Governor
Newsom established the Future of Work Commission in 2019 to bring together leaders from
across sectors to develop a public agenda for the state, focused on "creat[ing] inclusive, longterm economic growth and ensur[ing] workers and their families share in that success,” 84 with
attention to differing regional needs across the state.
In the wake of COVID-19, California’s booming economy has been seriously impacted. Despite making
the difficult decision to shut down the state in March in response to the pandemic, the
anticipated economic benefits of such action have been disappointing. In June 2020, David
Shulman, Senior Economist at UCLA Anderson School, forecasted that, after a 42% annual rate
of decline in real GDP, the state will not return to pre-recession levels of output until early
2023.85 Additionally, the state continues to experience high rates of unemployment as a result
of the pandemic. California recorded an exceptionally high unemployment rate of 16.4% in May
2020, outpacing the national average at that time of 13.3%.86 While the state’s unemployment
rate lowered to 10.8% in October 2020, California is still grappling with the economic
repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable
future.87
However, the state’s rainy day (i.e., reserve) fund, strengthened by Governor Jerry Brown in
2014 via a constitutional amendment with bipartisan support, provides some fiscal buffer in
times of recession by prioritizing one-time investments that address affordability. The state
annually sets aside 1.5% of the general fund, and half of the money is allocated as rainy day funds
to provide a safety net during economic downturns.88 Funds are withdrawn only when the
governor and legislature declare a fiscal emergency. Reserves in the 2019–2020 budget
stabilization account totaled $19.2 billion, and Governor Newsom allocated $16.5 billion to the
rainy day fund that year.89 Between March and October 2020, California withdrew $9.6 billion.90
82
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As such, the economic future of California is mixed with promise and unpredictability. Shulman
portends, “It will take all the king’s horses and all the king’s men to put the economy back
together again.”91
The Political Context
A Direct Democracy State
California’s political context is largely defined by its ballot initiative system. Since the initiative
system was adopted in the state constitution in 1911, California voters have had the right to
“propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.”92
Heralded as “the modern world’s most ambitious experiment of direct democracy,”93 the
California initiative process was originally introduced as a democratic check on the influence of
big businesses and politicians.94 Since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, however, the ballot
initiative system has evolved into a highly contentious “fourth branch of government.”95
Reforming property tax policy for decades to come, Proposition 13 limits property taxes to 1%
of the assessed value at time of purchase, restricts annual increases, and requires any state tax
increases to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the state legislature.96 Property taxes
previously served as a major source of funding for both the K–12 system and the California
Community Colleges (CCCs).97 In response to these dynamics, voters passed Proposition 98 in
1988, “which requires the state to dedicate a minimum of roughly 40% of its General Fund to
K–14 education each year.”98
The power of the ballot initiative system has largely gone unchecked—empowering California
voters and interest groups to use the initiative system to gain statewide traction for their
interests and to diversify the state’s political agenda. Unlike other U.S. states with initiative
systems, California “is the only state that does not permit some form of legislative repeal or
amendment of statutory initiatives, either directly after passage or after a specified number of
years.”99 The only exception to this is for propositions that explicitly stipulate a process for
amendment by the legislature. For example, in the 2020 election, Proposition 22 included
drafted language that a 7/8th “supermajority” legislative vote has the power to amend the bill.100
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Regional Divides Persist
Although California has gained an international reputation for being one of the most liberal
states in the nation, a closer look at both the history and regional differences of the state today
tells a more nuanced story. Until the 1992 gubernatorial election, California was viewed as a
moderately Republican state with conservative politics.101 In 1998, Gray Davis was elected the
first Democratic governor in the state in nearly 20 years102—after a historic recall election in
which Davis was portrayed as “a prisoner of liberal special interests with an undistinguished
record” by his opponent.103 This shifting leadership was just the tip a deeper shift happening
among California voters that is intricately rooted in the very demographic and economic shifts
this chapter highlights: “the dramatic turnaround was a convergence of economic, demographic
and cultural factors, along with years of denial by Republican leaders.”104 In particular, the outmigration of defense workers, following the end of the Cold War, and the in-migration of a new
wave of individuals from Latin America, rapidly changed the demographics of the state.105

Today, the electorate continues to be defined by largely regional factors, which are themselves
associated with demographic and economic factors. According to a 2020 Public Policy Institute
of California (PPIC) analysis of California’s “political geography,” “the land area of the state is
evenly balanced between [support for] the two [political] parties”—with the eastern, more
rural half of the state more Republican leaning.106 These urban–rural partisan divides are largely
subsumed by the growing concentration of the state’s population living in urban centers, such as
the Bay Area and Los Angeles.107 Some political issues in the state are not strongly influenced by
location, however: “at least a majority—but never more than two-thirds—in every place in the
state believes taxes are too high.”108 Other issues, such as housing affordability, are strongly
influenced by regional differences—with coastal regions much more likely to support policies in
favor of affordable housing than inland regions.109 Together, these factors suggest that any public
policy analysis of the state of California cannot assume the state’s monolithic liberal status but
must instead recognize regional political differences and the evolving demographics of the state.

The Higher Education Landscape

California Master Plan: A Vision for Excellence and Access
As discussed in the Introduction, the bedrock of California’s higher education system is the
California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960 (henceforth, the “Master Plan”). Developed
through a collaboration between the University of California (UC) and the State Department of
Education, the Master Plan was initially envisioned as a 15-year plan for the state’s higher
education system but continues to guide the system, now sixty years later.
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The original impetus for the development of the Master Plan was the dueling dynamics of the
growing crisis of higher education governance in the state and, in the historic words of then UC
president Clark Kerr, the “tidal wave” of new students associated with the aging-up of the Baby
Boomers and the passage of the GI Bill.110 From 1940 to 1960, individual higher education
institutions were “practically ungoverned,” there was a growing fear of mission creep among
the three segments of public higher education, and there was a burgeoning power imbalance
amongst the segments due to the limited financial powers of the Community Colleges and the
constitutional autonomy of the UC.111 Together, these dynamics left the underlying governance
structures of the higher education system incapable of adapting to meet the needs of the
anticipated boom in enrollment. As Patrick Callan, former president of the National Center for
Public Policy and Higher Education and the former Executive Director of the now retired
California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC), suggests, capacity issues were at the
heart of this crisis:
[In] ’59 there was a huge Baby Boom population. The kids of the GIs and all the people
who moved to California after World War II [were] in the pipeline, and the question
was: how much college and education California would provide, and how much that
would be organized, and what kind of sectors, and which kinds of institutions would get
which students?112
Clark Kerr saw it as necessary to clearly define the missions of each segment of higher
education, and to more broadly find a way to reconcile what had previously been seen as a
conflict in the state’s education system between excellence and access.113 To achieve this
balance, the Master Plan, as codified in law through the Donahoe Higher Education Act of 1960,
made several key contributions to the design and function of the California public higher
education system. As future chapters will explore, the logic of these contributions undergirds
today’s system, although the system has not been able to fully deliver on the initial aims of the
Master Plan. In the words of Dennis Jones, President Emeritus of the National Center for
Higher Education Management System, the Master Plan “was much less a plan than it was a pact
amongst the sectors that kept them from fighting over turf. It divided up the turf.” In particular,
the Master Plan “divided the turf” in five ways:114
1. Differentiation of Function & Admissions Pools: To more clearly differentiate both missions
and functions of the three segments of California’s public education system—the University of
California (UC), the California State Universities (CSUs), and the California Community
Colleges (CCCs) —one of the most significant contributions of the Master Plan was to
differentiate the functions and admissions pools of the segments.115 The Master Plan posited that
the UCs would receive the top eighth of the applicant pool and would specialize in research
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and the conferral of doctoral and professional degrees; the CSUs would admit the top third of
the applicant pool and would focus on undergraduate through master's degrees, with a focus on
teacher education; the CCCs would admit any student and would include 2-year degrees,
remedial instruction, ESL instruction, adult education, and workforce training.116 In reflecting on
the Master Plan in a 1993 interview, Clark Kerr shared that he saw this differentiation of
functions to be the most essential function of the Master Plan.117 More recent reviews of the
state’s higher education system show that segment eligibility pools have historically exceeded
those originally set out in the Master Plan: CSU enrolls nearly 41% of the state (compared to
the Master Plan’s aim of 33%), and the UC is at 13.9% (compared to the Master Plan’s aim of
12.5%).118
2. Community College Transfer: The establishment of a plan for community college transfer
was critical for ensuring that the system had the capacity to deliver on the Master Plan’s
promises of equity and access. The Master Plan called for the UC and CSU “to establish a lower
division to upper division ratio of 40:60 in order to provide transfer opportunities into the
upper division of Community College Students.”119 In other words, the Master Plan suggested
that each CSU and UC campus reserve spaces in their upper division (e.g., junior and senior
classes) to ensure that there is sufficient space for CCC juniors to transfer into upper division
majors at a 4-year public institution. By articulating that eligible community college transfers
receive priority in CSU and UC admissions, the Master Plan designed a safeguard for ensuring
that students who went through the community colleges eventually had access to a receiving a
degree from a 4-year institution. As a result of a 2015 budget process, the UC today has
updated its transfer expectations to enroll “only two new in-state freshmen for every in-state
transfer student.”120
3. Affordability, Fees, and Cal Grant: In the words of the UC Office of the President, the Master
Plan “reaffirmed California’s prior commitment to the principle of tuition-free education to
residents of the state”— with the exception of auxiliary costs—and also included provisions for
student aid (i.e., Cal Grant) “designed to ensure the needy and high performing students have
the ability to choose a California institution of their choice.”121 These provisions were designed
to ensure that all students in the state would not merely be admitted to California institutions
of higher education but that they would also be able to afford to attend those institutions.
4. Separate Governing Boards: Although the UC Board of Regents existed prior to the
enactment of the Donahoe Education Act, the Act effectively shifted governance authority over
the CSUs from the State Board of Education to a newly established CSU Board of Trustees.
Shortly after, in 1967, a Board of Governors was appointed for the California Community
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Colleges.122 These three boards continue to exist today as the primary leadership of California’s
public postsecondary systems (Figure 4). Although the Master Plan stipulated that there should
be separate governing boards among the segments, it left the UC Board of Regents with
relatively more authority, as per the constitutional authority afforded to the UC. Additionally,
each of the CCC campuses have a local governing board that influence many policies, whereas
the Chancellor’s offices have greater authority within the UCs and CSUs.
5. Higher Education Coordinating Agency: Central to the vision of the Master Plan was that
there would a be a central organizing body—a “coordinating council” composed of 12 members
with equal representation from the UCs, CSUs, CCCs, and independent colleges and
universities.123 Since the initial proposal for a coordinating council, the state established the
California Postsecondary Education Council (CPEC), whose duties extended to monitoring higher
education performance, participating in the segmental budget processes, supporting statewide
planning, and providing a forum for policy articulation.124 CPEC was effectively disbanded by
Governor Brown’s veto in 2011,125 leaving the state to rely on voluntary “coordination”
amongst segment leaders and private institutions. The state today lacks any independent policy
body to assess the state’s educational needs and the use of state tools of governance, finance,
regulation, and accountability to ensure public needs are addressed.126 Although the state does
not have the sort of coordinating agency as originally envisioned in the Master Plan today, there
have been efforts to create groups to address statewide higher education need—such as the
Governor’s Postsecondary Council, which brings together representatives from across the
segments, K–12, and the Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities to
work on higher education issues.
California’s Higher Education System Today
The structure of California’s higher education system today is largely grounded in the initial
blueprint of the Master Plan, which established a tripartite system of public higher education.
Although California’s public higher education system today does not exactly mirror the system
envisioned in the Master Plan, it remains centrally organized around the same underlying
structures and principles at the heart of the Master Plan.127 In addition to the public higher
education system, the state today is also home to 161 private nonprofit colleges and 143 forprofit institutions (Figure 3). These private colleges and institutions were part of the original
statewide vision of the Master Plan, which commended “the great contribution private colleges
and universities have made and will continue to make to the state” and suggested that private
higher education institutions have representation on the proposed statewide coordinating
board.128
The vast majority of the state’s 2.4 million students seeking at least an associate’s degree or
higher are enrolled within the public sector. Although the focus of our report is on the state’s
public system of higher education, California is also notable for its robust private sector of
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higher education, and is home to many of the most highly regarded private higher education
institutions both nationally and internationally.
Figure 3. Higher Education Percentage Enrollment by Institution Type
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● Private, for-profit

12%

16%

● Private, nonprofit
● University of California
● California State University

52%

● California Community Colleges

Source: IPEDS.129
The University of California (UC) system educates 12% of undergraduate students in the state and
is composed of 10 major campuses and three national research laboratories: Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory.130 This commitment to research is central to the mission of the UC, and it
is the primary public segment in the state responsible for educating graduate students, in
addition to undergraduate and professional students. The California State University (CSU)
systems consists of 23 campuses and educates 16% of enrolled higher education students in the
state. With the exception of a few doctoral degree offerings, the CSU’s primary function is to
provide undergraduate education and graduate education though the master’s level.131 Finally,
composed of 114 colleges and educating 52% of higher education students, the California
Community College (CCC) system is the nation’s largest system of higher education.132 The CCC
system is broadly committed to providing academic and vocational instruction to California
residents, and also offers remedial instruction, English as a second language (ESL) instruction,
noncredit offerings, and workforce training.133 In response to a growing population of
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“stranded” and underemployed Californians, the CCC’s new institution, Calbright, was
introduced in 2019 as the first online public higher education institution in the state.134
Figure 4. Segment Governing Boards of California Higher Education System135
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As established by the Master Plan, each of the three segments of the state’s public higher
education system are led by an organization board (Figure 4). Though each board varies slightly
in its composition, both the UC Board of Regents and the CSU Board of Trustees include a
number of ex officio members, such as the state governor and lieutenant governor. The state
governor also plays a key role by appointing a majority of board members—or all of them, as in
the case of the CCCs. The UC Board of Regents is notably the most autonomous of these
three boards, as the state constitution affords it the UC system at large “full powers of
organization and governance” with minimal legislative control.136 The CCC is unique in that
each campus—with the exception of Calbright—also has its own local board. In the case of
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Calbright, the Board of Governors is in charge of decision-making for the virtual campus.137
Each of the three public systems also have an academic senate, which operates in a shared
governance structure with each segment board. The senates are focused on dealing with
academic matters, and their responsibilities include establishing curriculum, setting grading
policies, setting the conditions for the granting of degrees.138
Straying from the initial vision of the Master Plan, today’s system has had no coordinating body
for public higher education since the dissolution of the California Education Commission
(CPEC) in 2011.139 When the CPEC was introduced in 1973, it had four primary purposes: (1)
monitoring higher education performance, (2) participating in each segment’s budgetary
processes, (3) developing a statewide education plan, and (4) providing “a forum for addressing
issues such as transfers from colleges to four-year universities, common course numbering, and
the A–G course requirements for university eligibility.”140 From its outset, however, CPEC had
fundamental design issues: a lack of clear state goals for higher education; a lack of a clear
mission in CPEC’s statutory charter; and a focus on establishing consensus amongst stakeholders
rather than leadership.141 Under the current state leadership of Governor Newsom, there has
been some initial movement towards establishing a Governor’s Advisory Board, although no
formal coordinating board has been established. As will be explored in the later chapter of this
report focused on fragmentation, a number of alternative groups and initiatives have been
developed by the Governor’s office and the individual segments to help the state work toward
a public agenda since the dissolution of CPEC.
Conclusion
The distinctiveness of California’s context has made the state at once a “model and antimodel
for the nation and sometimes the world.”142 The context presented in this chapter serves as the
foundation for understanding the dynamics presented in the following chapters—on the
disparities in performance, fragmentation of the state’s political and higher education systems,
and volatility of higher education finance. The dynamics highlighted in this chapter suggest that
any policy analysis of California’s higher education system must consider the role of shifting
demographics, regionalism, economy, and political context because these dynamics set the stage
for public policy at large in the state. As the state today grapples with the fallout of COVID-19,
climate change, an economic recession, and a national push for racial justice, higher education
has the potential to serve as a strategic asset to the state—only if it attends to these contextual
features of the state’s identity.
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DISPARITIES: COMPOUNDING FAULTLINES IN CALIFORNIA'S
FOUNDATION
Melissa Bodnar
x

Even though California’s overall educational attainment has increased, the state is
plagued by persistent and prevalent disparities in attainment by race, socioeconomic
status, and place.

x

Such disparities in educational attainment reflect disparities in postsecondary
performance, including preparation, access, and completion, by race, socioeconomic
status, place. Existing postsecondary access and attainment rates do not reflect the
growing diversity of California’s population.

x

These disparities yield inequities in the state’s workforce and economy, directly
impacting individual prosperity and social mobility on the basis of one’s lived
experience.

The State of Opportunity
“If we are serious about closing the achievement gap and income gap, we must get serious about
closing the opportunity gap. That begins with education.”
- Governor Gavin Newsom, 2018143
A nation founded upon the belief that anyone can achieve success through hard work and
determination, the United States has long embraced the idea of the American Dream.144 For
many, “America is known as ‘the land of opportunity’. But whether it deserves this reputation
has received too little attention.”145
Perna and Finney146 argue that the responsibility for ensuring opportunity, particularly as it
relates to postsecondary education, largely resides with the states. Because “state policy is
highly consequential to the performance of colleges and universities in meeting societal needs
for individual opportunity and national and state prosperity,” a systematic assessment of statespecific factors influencing postsecondary education is essential for understanding higher
education performance and ensuring access, opportunity, and success for a state’s residents.147
To that end, an examination of California would be incomplete without a consideration of
educational opportunities and the performance of higher education for those who call it home.
What factors advance or hinder an individual’s likelihood of being able to thrive? What role
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does education—in particular, higher education—play in promoting individual prosperity and
well-being for Californians of all backgrounds?
In this chapter, I examine which Californians flourish, which struggle, and why. I first document
how educational attainment is unequally distributed across the state’s population by dimensions
of race, socioeconomic status, and place. I then show how these disparities are linked to gaps in
indicators of state postsecondary performance, including: K-12 Preparation; Postsecondary
Access; and College Progression & Completion. Next, I show how these disparities
subsequently persist into the workforce, driving disparity in individuals’ employment and
economic prosperity. I conclude by showing the pressing implications of these disparities: Given
the state’s rapidly diversifying population and persistent disparities in educational opportunity
and related economic prosperity, California will face an uphill battle in realizing its equal
opportunity ideals if it does not first systematically address these gaps.
Educational Attainment
California is not prepared for its future: the state is simultaneously becoming more diverse;148
aging;149 and facing a statewide gap in workforce skills, with forecasts projecting a shortfall of 1.1
million workers with bachelor’s degrees to meet the needs of the economy by 2030.150 When
considering those Californians age 25 to 64 with short-term credentials in addition to an
associate degree or higher, the state’s educational attainment rate is roughly 51.1%.151 By this
measure, California ranks 26th in the nation,152 falling just below the national average of 51.3%.153
This reality is insufficient to sustain the needs of the state’s economy.154 Yet, even if the state
were able to greatly expand educational attainment, it must simultaneously reduce persistent
gaps by race, socioeconomic status, and place.
Even though California’s overall educational attainment increased by 12.5 percentage points
from 2008 to 2018 (38.6% to 51.1%), the state is plagued by prevalent disparities in attainment
by race. Asian and Pacific Islanders have the highest attainment levels (63.9%) in the state,
followed by Whites (54.8%), African Americans (36.4%), American Indians (25.2%), and
Hispanics (19.9%).155 Given the fact that Hispanic individuals represent the largest ethnic group
in California,156 and are projected to comprise a growing portion of the state’s population well
into the future,157 their low attainment rates illustrate a lack of equality in postsecondary access
and success in the state, which translates to unequal economic prosperity and social mobility.
148
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Increasing attainment in California will depend on the ability of the state and its system of
higher education to enroll and graduate a larger share of its diverse populous, including those
traditionally underserved by higher education. The state’s economic and workforce
competitiveness depend upon this.
In addition to gaps in educational attainment along students’ race, significant disparities by
socioeconomic status also exist. Nationally, students from families in the highest-income
quartile are 3.9 times more likely to graduate with a bachelor’s degree by age 24 than those in
the lowest-income quartile (62% compared to 16%).158 This gap has persisted over time,
declining only slightly since 1970, when the highest-income students were 6.6 times more likely
than the lowest-income students to graduate with a bachelor’s degree by age 24 (40%
compared to 6%).159 Additionally, students from the top two income quartiles accounted for
73% of all bachelor’s degrees awarded in 2018.160 In comparison, students from the lowest two
income quartiles accounted for only 27% of degrees awarded.161 Large gaps in educational
attainment also emerge when considering net worth. Nearly 54% of students from families in
the highest net worth quintile attain a postsecondary credential, compared with only 9.1% of
those from families in the lowest net worth quintile.162 These disparities persist when
considering outcomes for students who are eligible for the federal need-based Pell Grant.163 In
2017-2018, the federal government provided Pell Grants to 7 million students from low-income
families.164 Despite the grant’s success in providing low-income students with needed financial
support to access postsecondary education, there is a 15.5 percentage point gap between the
8-year completion rates for first-time, full-time Pell-eligible (39%) and non-Pell eligible students
(54.4%).165 For those low-income students who attend college, access is not a proxy for
success. If California is to realize statewide increases in educational attainment, it must address
gaps in opportunity and success for students from low-income families. The door to higher
education for socioeconomically disadvantaged residents must not only be opened wider, but
the state must also ensure these students receive support for their progress towards a degree.
Disparities in educational attainment in California also emerge when considering place. Among
California’s 12 regions,166 educational attainment, defined here as those with an associate or
bachelor’s degree or higher, is highest in the Bay Area (59%), Orange (49%), and San Diego
(48%) regions.167 In contrast, degree attainment is lowest in the Imperial (23%), San Joaquin
(25%), Central Sierra (30%), and Inland Empire (30%) regions.168 The 36 percentage point
difference in attainment between the state’s highest performing (Bay Area) and lowest
158
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performing (Imperial) regions underscores the stark regional differences in educational
attainment that exist within the state.169 In this regard, where you live in California is closely
linked to postsecondary opportunity and individual likelihood for success. For those in the
Imperial region, where 53% of residents have no college experience, the chance for
postsecondary success looks significantly different than for those in the Bay Area, where 52% of
residents have a bachelor’s degree and only 24% have no college.170 Improving educational
attainment in California as a whole will, as the data suggest, require regionally based efforts to
address access and success.
California’s public colleges and universities play an important role in increasing educational
attainment in the state, and reducing persistent gaps in opportunity. Educational attainment—
and subsequent social mobility and economic prosperity—is determined by several key facets of
higher education performance, including preparation, access, and completion. A fundamental
question remains: which Californians have the chance to engage in learning opportunities and,
subsequently, enjoy the associated benefits that access yields on completion? Large disparities in
higher education performance, from enrollment to completion, persist along the dimensions of
race, socioeconomic status, and place, limiting students’ abilities to equally share in the lifelong
outcomes associated with postsecondary education.
Disparity & Higher Education Performance
The term “disparity” is often used to describe social or economic conditions that are
considered to be unfair, unequal, or dissimilar.171 In examining California, I consider disparity
through three major lenses: race and ethnicity; socioeconomic status; and place. Over the
course of a person’s lifetime, these factors influence individual chance for success, which I define
as access to a combination of educational, workforce, and economic opportunities. Given the
increasingly important role of postsecondary education in promoting the well-being of
individuals and society, I examine these three lenses—and, by extension, the various disparities
that they yield—through state performance indicators, including: : K-12 Preparation;
Postsecondary Access; and College Progression & Completion.
In considering disparities in the state of California, I examine current point-in-time data rather
than historical trends, given our focus on the state’s immense population of increasingly diverse
individuals. While various gains in higher education performance over the years are a sign of
improvement, such progress is not sufficient given California’s population demographics and the
changing needs of its people, economy, and workforce. The growth and diversification of
California’s population has rapidly outpaced these improvements. My analysis reveals that
opportunity for postsecondary education is unevenly distributed and individual chance for
success is limited for many Californians by the intersection of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic
status, and place. Each Californian’s unique, lived experience, as manifested in these areas,
dictates whether they will thrive in the state.
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Race & Ethnicity172
An important component of postsecondary access and success is preparation at the high school
level. California’s A–G sequence, a set of college preparatory courses that are required for
admission to the University of California (UC) and California State University (CSU), has
become an indicator of college readiness among high schoolers in the state.173 Approximately
50% of all California high school graduates complete A–G courses, but completion varies
greatly by race and ethnicity (Figure 5). 174 Asians and Whites complete this coursework at much
higher rates than California high schoolers as a whole.175 In contrast, Latinx,176 Pacific Islander,
Black, and Native American or Alaska Native high schoolers complete A–G coursework at
significantly lower rates than their Asian and White peers.177 These differences alone increase
disparities in who can attend a UC or CSU institution.
Figure 5. A–G Course Completion Rate for Expected High School Graduates &
12th-Grade Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity, 2018–2019
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Beyond college readiness, there is similar variation in high school graduation rates for California’s
youth. In 2018–2019, the four-year adjusted cohort graduation rate was highest for Asian high
schoolers at approximately 94% and Whites at 88.4%.180 In contrast, American Indian or Alaska
Native (74.8%) learners had the lowest graduation rates, followed by African American (76.8%),
Hispanic or Latino (82.1%), and Pacific Islander (84.6%) students.181 These unequal rates in
college preparation and high school graduation translate to unequal rates of enrollment in
postsecondary education.
California’s average college-going rate, or the percentage of California public high school
graduates who enroll in postsecondary education within 12- to 16-months of graduation, is
64.4%.182 Approximately 84% of Asian and 70% of White high school graduates immediately
enroll in college, compared with only 60% of African American, 59% of Pacific Islander, 58% of
Hispanic or Latino, and 50% of American Indian or Alaska Native students.183 While the data
highlight racial disparities in the percentage of California’s high school learners who enroll in
college, it is important to note that college-going rates overestimate college enrollment among
high school graduates because they do not take into account those students who dropped out
of high school. In fact, the high school cohort dropout rate in California is roughly 9%.184 Of
those students who enter ninth grade and dropout prior to graduating, the majority are from
historically underrepresented groups: 15.6% American Indian or Alaska Native; 14.2% Black or
African American, and 10.2% Hispanic or Latino.185 In contrast, a much smaller proportion of
high school dropouts are Asian (3%) or White (6.7%).186
In 2018–2019, the number of students enrolled in postsecondary institutions in the United States
reached 26.3 million; of this population, California enrolled approximately 3.8 million
students.187 Despite the fact that Latinx students comprise roughly 50.8%188 of California’s high
school graduates, they represent only 39% of total college enrollments in California.189 In
contrast, Asians in the state comprise roughly 10.5%190 of high school graduates but represent
nearly 14% of all college enrollments.191
While the enrollment rates of underrepresented groups highlight overarching inequities in
access to postsecondary education for high school graduates, enrollment patterns among these
groups also reveal significant differences in enrollment patterns by institution type. As the Public
179
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Policy Institute of California (PPIC) notes, “greater numbers of underrepresented students
enroll at CSU and the community colleges than at UC.”192 More specifically, among Latinx
students, an overwhelming 74% enroll at a California Community College, while only 4% enroll
at a UC.193 Among Black Californians, 64% enroll at a CCC, while only 2% enroll at a UC.194
Black Californians also disproportionately enroll at private for-profit institutions (19%)
compared with their peers from other ethnic groups.195 Equally concerning is the fact that, of
those students entering a California Community College in 2009–2010 who were on track to
transfer, only 38% ever did.196 Recall, as outlined in The Nation State, nearly 40% of California’s
total population is Hispanic.197 For underrepresented students in the state, particularly the
nearly three-fourths of all Latinx learners who enroll disproportionately in the state’s two-year
institutions,198 patterns in access and enrollment by institution type matter given variations in
institutional outcomes. Inequities in access for a significant and growing subset of California’s
population, in turn, can negatively impact students’ chance for completion and long-term
prosperity and success.
While educational attainment is an important measure of the proportion of individuals in
California who have earned a degree, certificate, or credential beyond high school, it does not
account for in-migration.199 As a result, educational attainment is not a true indicator of the
number of postsecondary credentials the state of California produces. Thus, the performance of
higher education, or how well California’s higher education systems are working for the state’s
residents, is better measured by examining college graduation rates, or the percentage of
students who began college at a California institution that ultimately attained a credential.
California’s graduation rates within three years at two-year institutions and within six years at
four-year institutions in California have fluctuated over time. Between 2005 and 2019,
graduation rates within 150% of normal time increased by 3.3 percentage points at four-year
nonprofit institutions in the state, while falling by 4.6 percentage points at two-year nonprofit
institutions.200 Despite minimal gains and even slight declines in graduation rates over time,
approximately 50% of Californians that began college in 2013 graduated with an associate or
bachelor’s degree within three or six years, respectively, compared to 42% nationally.201
Looking specifically at California’s public postsecondary sector, graduation rates within 150% of
normal time vary greatly, but are highest at UCs (84%) and lowest at CSUs (59%) and CCCs
(31%).202
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Within racial and ethnic groups, graduation rates are highest at both two- and four-year
institutions for Asians and Whites, and lowest for Black, Hispanic, and American Indian or
Alaska Native learners (Figure 6).203 Within California’s public higher education systems,
including the UCs, CSUs, and CCCs, graduation rates are also higher for Asians and Whites
than for Hispanic, American Indian/Alaska Native, and African American students. 204 Thus, even
when historically underserved populations of learners are able to access higher education in the
state, they are still disadvantaged in moving toward completion, graduating at lower rates than
their Asian and White peers in all of the state’s public sectors.
Figure 6. Graduation Rates within 150% of Normal Time (Bachelor’s in 6 years for
cohort year 2013; Associate in 3 years for cohort year 2016) by Race & Ethnicity
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Socioeconomic Status
Bohn and Thorman206 contend that “the gap between rich and poor is especially wide in
California,” a reality that is difficult to reconcile with the sheer size and immensity of the state’s
economy. Despite the fact that California’s economy is the largest of any state, and the fifth
largest in the world,207 its wealth is unevenly distributed, with families at the top of the income
distribution earning approximately 12.3 times more than the families at the bottom of the
distribution.208 In 2019, approximately 11.8%, or roughly 4.6 million, Californians were living
below poverty,209 and, in 2018, roughly 17.6%, or 6.8 million, lacked enough resources to meet
basic needs.210 Further, more than a third (35.2%) of Californians at that time were considered
poor or “near” poor.211 Given that poverty and education level are closely linked, access to
opportunity and chance for success in California is inextricably tied to socioeconomic status.212
At the K–12 level, the proportion of socioeconomically disadvantaged students in California has
grown significantly over time. In 1990, 36% of students were approved for free or reducedprice lunch; by 2019, that number nearly doubled to 63%.213 This increase in the proportion of
schools serving largely economically disadvantaged learners has important implications for
college readiness. In fact, A–G course completion rates are significantly higher at more
economically advantaged high schools.214 At the student level, “socioeconomically disadvantaged
students are half as likely to be prepared [for postsecondary education] as their more
prosperous peers,”215 with only 39% of economically disadvantaged high schoolers completing
A–G coursework.216 In addition to lagging behind their wealthier peers in overall A–G course
completion, economically disadvantaged students also graduate from high school at lower rates
than the total population. In 2015–2016, California’s overall high school graduation rate was
84%, but lower income students graduated at a rate of 79%.217
For those low-income students who do graduate high school, more than half (58%) enroll in
postsecondary education after completing high school.218 However, college-going rates for
students from the lowest-income families in the state fall short of those from high-income
families. Roughly 67% of recent high school graduates with family incomes under $30,000 enroll
in postsecondary education, compared with 88% of recent high school graduates with family
incomes over $150,000.219 While postsecondary enrollment among low-income students is
206
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relatively high overall, they predominantly enroll in CCCs.220 Of those socioeconomically
disadvantaged students enrolled in the state’s public sector, more than half (69%) matriculate at
CCCs, while only 10% enroll at UCs—a reality that is likely tied in part to this population’s low
A–G course completion rates (Figure 7).221 In contrast, among students from families earning
more than $75,000, only 6% enroll at a CCC, while 58% enroll at a UC or CSU, and 30% enroll
at a private nonprofit.222 Thus, equitable access to opportunity, as afforded through the type of
institution attended, is significantly skewed against socioeconomically disadvantaged students in
California.
Figure 7. Low-Income Student Enrollment by Institution Type, 2017
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Unfortunately, for socioeconomically disadvantaged students, access to postsecondary
education is not enough. Where a student enrolls has implications for their postsecondary
outcomes. Less than half of all community college students transfer or obtain a degree or
certificate within six years.224 In fact, “students who start at a community college are less likely
to earn a bachelor’s degree than those who start at a four-year institution.”225 This puts lowincome students, 66% of whom enroll in the CCC system,226 at a distinct disadvantage—
particularly in terms of long-term economic prosperity. However, even when enrolled at four220
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year institutions in the state, socioeconomically disadvantaged learners still face barriers to
completion (Figure 8).
On average, low-income students graduate at lower rates at UC, private nonprofit, and CSU
institutions than their more economically advantaged peers.227 Equity gaps in degree completion
between student populations that are low-income and not low-income are largest (11
percentage points) at CSU and private nonprofit schools (9 percentage points), and smallest at
UC (6 percentage points).228 Considering that approximately 55% of CSU students are
considered low-income, and that more socioeconomically disadvantaged Californians enroll at
CSUs than UCs overall, this population’s lower graduation rates are particularly concerning.229
Figure 8. Six-Year Graduation Rates at Four-Year Institutions by Student Type
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Place
In a state as large as California, where you live matters. Geographic location within the state
not only influences the availability of job opportunities but also impacts a host of educational
and economic outcomes, including: educational experience and preparation, the types of
postsecondary institutions you can attend, whether or not you can access those opportunities,
and your long-term economic prospects. Despite California’s vast size and geographic diversity,
most public elementary and secondary schools in the state are concentrated in cities and
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suburban areas.231 Approximately 7% of schools are located in towns, defined as territories
inside an urban cluster that surround a denser, more urbanized area, and 11% are located in
rural communities.232 This means that roughly 82% of K-12 schools are situated in California’s
cities and suburbs, where they serve nearly 89% of the state’s students.233 Despite the
concentration of many learners in cities and suburbs, more than half a million students, or
roughly one in ten, live in rural areas.234 The distribution of schools across urban, suburban, and
rural communities necessitates consideration of resource allocation and educational
opportunity across California’s primary and secondary schools in these areas. According to
Betts et al.,235 “counties with large suburban areas tend to have more resources than counties
with heavy urban or rural populations”—a reality that precipitates location-based disparities in
K–12 preparation.
A lower share of rural students than urban students enroll in Advanced Placement (AP) classes
for college credit; in 2017-2018, 16.3% of rural high school seniors completed AP coursework
and took the AP exam, compared with 27.6% of urban high school seniors.236 Additionally, rural
schools are much less likely than their urban peers to offer the full A–G course sequence.237
When rural schools do offer the A–G curriculum, however, fewer rural students (28.1%)
complete the college preparatory courses than their urban peers (41.3%).238 While graduation
rates are comparable between urban and rural high schoolers, rural students are significantly
less prepared for college than their urban peers when they earn their diplomas (Figure 9, see
following page).239
Beyond college preparation at the high school level, access to postsecondary education is also
closely tied to location. In fact, “geography plays a key role in the options and opportunities
available to a student.”240 Roughly 60% of first-year students enroll within 50 miles of home.241
On a more granular level, the median distance from students’ homes to the colleges where they
matriculate is roughly 8 miles for those attending public two-year colleges, 18 miles for those
attending public four-year colleges, and 46 miles for those attending private nonprofit
institutions.242 This trend is particularly concerning when considering access through a
geographic lens; “the farther students live from any particular college, the less likely they are to

231
“Selected statistics from the public elementary and secondary education universe: School year 2015-16,” National Center for Education
Statistics, 2018, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018052/tables/table_04.asp.
232
Ibid., author calculation.
233
Ibid., author calculation.
234
Carolyn Jones, "The Long Road to College for California's Small Towns: The Push to 4-year Degrees Starts in Elementary Schools," EdSource,
December 20, 2019, https://edsource.org/2019/the-long-road-to-college-from-californias-small-towns/621428.
235
Julian R. Betts, Kim S. Rueben, and Anne Danenberg, "Equal Resources, Equal Outcomes? The Distribution of School Resources and Student
Achievement in California," Public Policy Institute of California, 2000, xiii, https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_200JBR.pdf.
236
Carolyn Jones, "The Long Road to College for California's Small Towns: The Push to 4-year Degrees Starts in Elementary Schools," EdSource,
December 20, 2019, https://edsource.org/2019/the-long-road-to-college-from-californias-small-towns/621428.
237
"A-G Courses," Public Policy Institute of California, accessed October 27, 2020, https://www.ppic.org/blog/tag/a-g-courses/.
238
Carolyn Jones, "The Long Road to College for California's Small Towns: The Push to 4-year Degrees Starts in Elementary Schools," EdSource,
December 20, 2019, https://edsource.org/2019/the-long-road-to-college-from-californias-small-towns/621428.
239
Ibid.
240
Elin Johnson, "Education Deserts," Inside Higher Ed, December 20, 2019,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/12/20/access-higher-education-tilts-heavily-toward-urban-areas.
241
Nicholas Hillman and Taylor Weichman, "Education Deserts: The Continued Significance of ‘Place’ in the Twenty-First Century," American
Council on Education, Center for Policy Research and Strategy, 2016,
https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Education-Deserts-The-Continued-Significance-of-Place-in-the-Twenty-First-Century.pdf.
242
Ellen Wexler, "Geography matters," Inside Higher Ed, February 3, 2016,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/03/when-students-enroll-college-geography-matters-more-policy-makers-think.

“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA

38

enroll.”243 If students make enrollment decisions based on where they live, location must be
part of larger conversations about postsecondary access. Yet, in California, the majority of the
state’s public postsecondary institutions are concentrated in clusters along the coast and
throughout the central part of the state—typically in more urban communities.244,245 As one
moves inland from the coast into the more disparate, rural parts of the state, the number of
public postsecondary institutions declines, and UC and CSU institutions in particular become
scarcer and more spread out—especially in counties near the state’s northern and eastern
borders.246
Figure 9. Measures of College Readiness, Urban and Rural Schools
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To this end, two of California’s twelve regions—Central Sierra and Imperial248—are considered
to be education deserts, or areas in which there are zero colleges or universities nearby, or in
which a single community college is the only public, broad-access institution in close
proximity.249 Both regions, which are largely rural in nature, feature just one California

243

Ibid.
“California Postsecondary to Prosperity Dashboard,” California Competes, accessed October 2020, https://californiacompetes.org/p2p.
245
"California - Rural definitions: State-level maps," United States Department of Agriculture, accessed October 17,
2020,https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/DataFiles/53180/25559_CA.pdf?v=0.
246
“California Postsecondary to Prosperity Dashboard,” California Competes, accessed October 2020, https://californiacompetes.org/p2p.
247
Ibid.
248
“Postsecondary to Prosperity: Examining California's Opportunity Landscape,” California Competes, July 2020,
https://californiacompetes.org/assets/general-files/CACompetes_P2P-Full-Report.pdf.
249
Nicholas Hillman and Taylor Weichman, "Education Deserts: The Continued Significance of ‘Place’ in the Twenty-First Century," American
Council on Education, Center for Policy Research and Strategy, 2016,
https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Education-Deserts-The-Continued-Significance-of-Place-in-the-Twenty-First-Century.pdf.
244

“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA

39

Community College each within their limits.250 Conversely, the Bay Area and Los Angeles
regions are home to roughly 41% of all CCCs, 43% of all CSUs, and 33% of all UCs in the
state.251 Given the high proportion of California’s total population concentrated in these
regions, it is reasonable to assume that a significant share of the state’s public institutions would
be located here, but such a reality deprives more disparate, rural communities of reasonable
access to these institutions. If you are situated in the state’s denser, more urban areas,
postsecondary options are more abundant.252 For those living in the state’s rural communities,
however, opportunity quickly dwindles as college campuses become more spread out across
greater distances and as the number of public four-year institutions decreases.253 Such a reality
limits access to opportunity on the basis of the types of institutions Californians can reasonably
engage with in relation to their geographic location. For these reasons, rural Californians tend
to have fewer postsecondary education options.254
Given Californians’ unequal geographic access to college, when they do pursue postsecondary
education, it is no surprise that enrollment patterns vary regionally. Among high school graduates
from the state’s less populous rural and desert regions255 (Central Sierra, Imperial, North–Far
North, and Upper Sacramento Valley256), roughly 43% do not enroll in postsecondary
education.257 Of those who do enroll in college, the majority (42%) enroll at a CCC institution,
with only 3% attending a UC and 7% attending a CSU.258 In contrast, enrollment rates at UCs
(7%) and CSUs (12%) are highest among recent high school graduates in the state’s more
populous urban regions—nearly double that of rural grads.259 As the data suggest, rural high
school graduates are less likely to enroll in postsecondary education than their urban peers,
and, when they do enroll, they matriculate at slightly higher rates at CCCs and at significantly
lower rates at CSUs and UCs.
Additionally, for students who enroll within the boundaries of the regions that they call home,
inequality between urban and rural areas is further amplified based on the availability of
postsecondary options within regional bounds. For example, 100% of residents enrolling at
institutions within the Imperial and Central Sierra regions matriculate at a California
Community College.260 While enrollment in most regions of California is highest at CCCs, the
spread of enrollment is more varied in areas where there are more public four-year options.
Approximately 69% of local residents attending college in the Bay Area region enroll in CCCs,
while an additional 13% enroll in CSUs, and 8% in UCs.261 In the San Diego region, 52% of local
residents attend CCCs, and 11% attend CSUs.262 In rural areas where CSUs are accessible
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within regional bounds, students matriculate at these institutions at greater rates than many of
their urban peers. Roughly 55% of local residents attending college in the Upper Sacramento
Valley region enroll at CSUs, outpacing enrollment at the region’s CCCs by 10 percentage
points.263 Likewise, 80% of residents in the North–Far North region matriculate at local CCCs,
with an additional 18% enrolling at CSUs, the second highest in-region CSU enrollment rate
across California’s 12 regions.264 On average, local enrollment at CSUs situated in more
populous regions of the state is approximately 13%, falling below the average rate of enrollment
(18%) at CSUs in more rural regions.265 As the data suggest, when given the opportunity to
enroll in a regional CSU, rural residents tend to matriculate at slightly higher rates.
Beyond enrollment, regional disparities also emerge when considering postsecondary
outcomes. Five-year bachelor’s degree graduation rates are highest in the Central Coast,
Sacramento–Tahoe, Bay Area, Los Angeles, and Orange regions (Figure 10).266 In contrast, fiveyear bachelor’s graduation rates are the lowest of all regions in the rural North–Far North.267
Given that five of California’s 12 regions fall below the statewide average for bachelor’s
completion, the state has much work to do to improve graduation rates across regions of all
types; however, its urban centers do generally fare better than their more rural counterparts in
the proportion of bachelor’s degrees produced within regional bounds.
Figure 10. Five-Year Bachelor’s Degree Graduation Rates by Region, 2016–2017
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Employment, Economic Prosperity, and Social Mobility
Disparities in educational performance—from college preparation and high school graduation
to college enrollment and completion—have important implications for individuals’ workforce
outcomes, driving disparity in employment and social mobility. Across the United States,
“postsecondary education is increasingly seen as an important step for obtaining beneficial longterm occupational and economic outcomes.”269 On average, those in the United States with a
doctoral or professional degree enjoy median weekly earnings ($1,883) that are more than
three times higher than those with less than a high school diploma ($592).270 While earnings
increase in proportion to the level of education attained, unemployment rates decrease as the
level of education increases. The unemployment rate in the United States is lowest for those
with a doctoral (1.1%), professional degree (1.6%), master’s degree (2%), or bachelor’s degree
(2.2%), compared with those with less than a high school diploma (5.4%).271 Quite simply,
college graduates fare better than those without postsecondary education. Higher education
performance is especially pertinent when considering this fact. As a result, unequal
postsecondary performance in California, and gaps in overall educational attainment, yield
significant disparities in economic prosperity and social mobility within the state by race,
socioeconomic status, and place.
In total, 64% of all Californians earn a living wage.272 However, the percentage of families
earning a living wage varies greatly by race and ethnicity, with Black (51%), Latinx (46%), and
Native American or Alaska Native Californians (45%) disproportionately struggling to do so.273
This fact is also reflected in median income. The median income for Asian ($53,740) and White
Californians ($56,000) is close to $30,000 more than the lowest earning groups (Native
American or Alaska Native at $25,000; Latinx at $29,400).274 Alarmingly, wealth in California is
even more unevenly distributed than income.275 In Los Angeles alone, median net worth for
White families was $355,000 in 2014, while the median net worth for Black and Latinx families
was just a fraction of that at $76,000 and $46,000, respectively.276 Additionally,
underrepresented Californians are more likely to be affected by unemployment. In August
2020, the unemployment rate in California climbed to 15.9% as a result of the economic
downturn from the COVID-19 pandemic.277 Black and Hispanic residents in the state
disproportionately contributed to this increase, recording unemployment levels over 18%
compared with Whites (13.5%) and Asians (14.2%).278

269
“Postsecondary Attainment: Differences by Socioeconomic Status,” National Center for Education Statistics, last updated May 2015,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_tva.asp.
270
“Learn More, Earn More: Education Leads to Higher Wages, Lower Unemployment,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2020,
https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2020/data-on-display/education-pays.htm.
271
Ibid.
272
“Statewide,” California Competes, accessed October 2020, https://californiacompetes.org/p2p/regions?region=statewide.
273
“Postsecondary to Prosperity: Examining California's Opportunity Landscape,” California Competes, July 2020,
https://californiacompetes.org/assets/general-files/CACompetes_P2P-Full-Report.pdf.
274
“Statewide,” California Competes, accessed October 2020, https://californiacompetes.org/p2p/regions?region=statewide.
275
Sarah Bohn and Tess Thorman, “Income Inequality in California,” Public Policy Institute of California, January 2020,
https://www.ppic.org/publication/income-inequality-in-california/.
276
Esi Hutchful, "The Racial Wealth Gap: What California Can Do about a Long-Standing Obstacle to Shared Prosperity," California Budget and
Policy Center, December 2018,
https://calbudgetcenter.org/resources/the-racial-wealth-gap-what-california-can-do-about-a-long-standing-obstacle-to-shared-prosperity/.
277
"State Unemployment by Race and Ethnicity," Economic Policy Institute, updated August 2020,
https://www.epi.org/indicators/state-unemployment-race-ethnicity/.
278
Ibid.

“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA

42

Among educational groups, the poverty rate in California is lowest (4.5%) for those with a
bachelor’s degree or higher.279 Additionally, median earnings for Californians 25 years and over
with a bachelor’s degree are $31,584 higher than those with no education beyond high school,
and $23,988 higher than those with some college or an associate degree.280 As the data suggest,
socioeconomic status is directly impacted by higher education. Low-income students’ chance for
greater lifetime earnings and upward economic mobility increases when they enroll and persist
at four-year institutions—a reality that has not yet been fully realized in California, where lowincome students enroll at and graduate from four-year institutions at lower rates than their
economically advantaged peers.
Across California, there are also regional variations in the type of work available and the
percentage of residents earning a living wage for their work. Jobs in the North–Far North,
Upper Sacramento Valley, San Joaquin Valley, and Imperial regions281 are more likely to pay low
wages than jobs in the Bay Area.282 Additionally, those living in the Central Sierra (where 70%
earn a living wage), Sacramento–Tahoe (70%), Bay Area (67%), Central Coast (67%), and
Orange (67%) regions are more likely to earn a living wage than those living in the Imperial
region (55%).283 Across California’s 12 regions, those with the lowest median income are
concentrated in more desert and rural areas (Imperial at $28,169 and Upper Sacramento Valley
at $31,100).284 However, the San Joaquin, Inland, and Los Angeles regions, which are home to
approximately 19 million Californians,285 have an average combined median income of
$36,700,286 which falls below the statewide average of $45,300.287 As the data suggest,
Californians in all regions face challenges to financial health and wellbeing.
Upward economic mobility also varies regionally across the state. In particular, “children born
in California cities [Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Francisco, and San Jose] into the bottom
income quintile have an above-average chance of rising to the top quintile.”288 As this indicator
suggests, economic mobility is relatively high in California’s cities overall. One possible
explanation is the high rate of college attendance for low-income students in the state’s
metropolitan areas, including San Francisco, San Jose, Los Angeles, San Diego, and
Sacramento.289 Additionally, Chetty et al.290 found that mid-tier public colleges, such as
California State University institutions, have relatively high economic mobility rates. In fact,
California State University–Los Angeles has the highest mobility rate of all four-year
postsecondary institutions examined across the United States, with nearly 10% of students
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coming from families in the bottom quintile and reaching the top quintile.291 California State
Polytechnic University–Pomona also ranked in the top ten for this metric, with a mobility rate
of 6.8%.292 Given the important role that mid-tier public institutions play in economic mobility,
and CSU’s track record of success in this area, it is probable that mobility in California will be
higher in the urban areas where CSUs are more largely concentrated, further disadvantaging
students in rural communities that lack access to these institutions.
As the data highlight, disparities in educational attainment and higher education performance
among California’s most diverse residents drive inequities in employment, economic prosperity,
and social mobility. Even the associated benefits from postsecondary education (i.e.,
employment, income, and wealth) are largely uneven due to very inequitable starting points,
making it difficult for the state’s diverse populations to get ahead. For these individuals,
disadvantage begins at a young age and largely persists throughout adult life. As California’s
population becomes increasingly diverse, the state must address racial and ethnic gaps in
educational attainment and postsecondary performance if it wants to ensure opportunity and
economic viability for an increasingly important subset of its residents.
California’s socioeconomically disadvantaged residents face barriers to opportunity and success
at numerous stages of the education-to-career pipeline. These individuals are not as prepared
for college as their advantaged peers, and, when they do enroll in postsecondary education,
they are disproportionately concentrated in two-year institutions where they are further
saddled with a reduced likelihood of transfer or bachelor’s degree completion. For these
students, the chance of getting ahead in life is disproportionately tied to the postsecondary
opportunities that they can access within California. As Chetty et al.293 argue, “children from
low- and high-income families have similar earnings outcomes conditional on the college they
attend.” This suggests that access to college, particularly to well-performing colleges with high
graduation and mobility rates, is positively correlated with economic prosperity for
socioeconomically disadvantaged populations.294 Therefore, low-income individuals in California
cannot succeed without improved postsecondary preparation, access, and completion. In order
to get ahead, socioeconomically disadvantaged Californians need equitable access to the starting
line.
Lastly, when it comes to chance for prosperity and success in California, where you live also
matters. Location in the state not only dictates which postsecondary institutions you can
geographically access but also determines how well prepared you are for college-level work,
your chance for success upon enrolling, the type of employment you can access in the
workforce, and whether you can afford to live in a specific community based on these factors.
Failure to examine the unique circumstances of each individual region in California can mask
variations in higher education performance in the state and, by extension, differences in regional
economic opportunity.
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Opportunity & Success: When Disparities Compound
Disparities exist as dimensions of individual identity among California’s residents. However,
disparities in lived experience lead to broader disparities within the state’s public postsecondary
systems. Learners in California are sorted into the state’s very distinct sectors of higher
education, with 52% of Californians enrolling in CCCs, 16% in CSUs, and 12% in UCs.295 As
they are sorted into these silos, the structure of California’s public postsecondary systems puts
some learners at a distinct disadvantage based on their lived experiences as disparities
compound in the areas of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, place, and age (a factor we
have not addressed here but that emerges as another important consideration in examining
access, opportunity, and success in California). The differential graduation rates of the sectors,
as referenced earlier in this report, further exaggerate disparities at the individual level as
students exit these systems.296
As California’s population becomes more diverse, and as an increasing proportion of its
residents are born in the lower end of the income distribution, disparities in performance must
be addressed if the state hopes to meet the needs of its workforce and fuel long-term
economic viability. Higher education can be a solution for tackling these challenges. In fact,
“higher education is the one place where society addresses social mobility in an economic
way.”297 Expanding access to opportunity, particularly for California’s marginalized and lowerincome residents, is imperative for mobilizing individual chance for success. Higher education is
a prime resource for the state to leverage in addressing these concerns. While the state’s
public postsecondary systems have already acknowledged these issues through such efforts as
the CCC Vision for Success,298 CSU Graduation Initiative 2025,299 and UC 2030,300 much work
remains to be done. California must build on this momentum moving forward to eliminate
equity gaps that manifest at all stages of life—and to ensure that its people have an equal chance
to achieve prosperity and success. To that end, public postsecondary education in the state
must be leveraged for the benefit of all rather than a select few.
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SURVEYING FRAGMENTATION IN CALIFORNIA’S HIGHER
EDUCATION POLICY LANDSCAPE
Elizabeth Dunens & Maya Kaul
x

The faultline of fragmentation in higher education policy traces across California’s
political, legislative, postsecondary systems, and accountability structures.

x

Fragmentation in and across these domains has trickle-down consequences for
California’s students, public, and progress.

x

Without a long-term, cross-sector vision for higher education in the state, policy
approaches to address California’s most pressing postsecondary issues will continue to be
piecemeal.

Fragmentation as Faultline
In this chapter, we examine the theme of fragmentation that emerged from our analysis of
primary and secondary data on the structure and functioning of California’s higher education
systems and policy since 1990. Before delving into our findings on this faultline, it is necessary
to first explain what we mean by fragmentation.
Fragmentation is defined as “the process or state of breaking or being broken into small or
separate parts.”301 As such, it is neither inherently positive nor negative, but its unique contexts,
degree, pervasiveness, and consequences must be considered. Fragmentation can occur
intentionally or unintentionally, and its utility can shift as situations evolve. Take as example the
1960 Master Plan delineation of the specific roles served by each of the state’s three public
higher education systems. This segmentation was a strategic act to mitigate mission creep and
improve enrollment and graduation for the state’s growing student population.302 Yet, 60 years
later, the same approach that kept the systems from stepping on each other's toes has also kept
them from learning how to dance well with one other. Add to this the increasingly complex
choreography required to meet statewide educational attainment and workforce needs, and it
becomes clear: although fragmentation can be useful, we must stay alert of its limitations and
adverse consequences.
Drawing from our interviews and secondary data, we map key manifestations of fragmentation
that influence statewide capacity for setting and implementing a consistent higher education
agenda for the state. As visualized in Figure 11, these manifestations are organized into three
areas: (1) Gubernatorial and legislative authority and leadership; (2) Higher education systems
organization and missions; and (3) Accountability structures to ensure that higher education
addresses public purposes. For each manifestation, we highlight key forces that maintain or
exacerbate fragmentation. We conclude with a summary of the faultline’s negative
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consequences and reflect on how the unprecedented challenges of 2020 might increase
alignment or further calcify historically problematic divisions.
Figure 11. Conceptual Mapping of Fragmentation Across California’s Higher
Education Policy Landscape

Political & Legislative
Authority

Accountability
Structures

Higher Education
Systems

A Fragmented Approach to Policy in a Strong Governor State
“I think that one of the beauties of higher education as a policy area is that it doesn't have to be a blue
or a red area. Everyone across the spectrum actually has some regard and desire for us to have a
robust and successful higher education system.”
- Dr. Lande Ajose, Senior Policy Advisor for Higher Education
Office of Governor Gavin Newsom
In the area of gubernatorial and legislative authority, the state employs a fragmented approach
to higher education policy across leadership terms. In recent decades, the state’s commitment
to higher education has not wavered significantly across administrations. Yet policy priorities
and strategy are subject to party politics, and over the past 60 years California has had an active
rotation between Democratic and Republican control of the governor’s seat (Table 2, see
following page). Moreover, even with consecutive partisan control of the governorship, there can be
discontinuity in the state’s higher education policy agenda due to differing priorities between individual
governors. This is most recently visible in the leadership transition from Governor Jerry Brown
(2011–2019) to Governor Gavin Newsom (2019–present).
Newsom’s victory in 2018 represented the first time in over a century that the Democratic
party experienced back-to-back gubernatorial wins in California.303 Both Brown and Newsom
have strong track records of commitment to education. Governor Brown’s two terms have
been characterized as “the most extensive shakeup of California’s K-12 public education system
over any comparable period in the state’s history.”304 Scholar William Tierney described
George Skelton, “Democrats Have a Mega-Majority in the California Legislature. Expect them to Swing for the Fences,” The Los Angeles
Times, December 3, 2018, https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-skelton-democrats-legislature-supermajority-20181203-story.html.
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Brown’s “constant drumbeat to exert fiscal administrative prudence, to increase productivity
and to hold down costs” as improving the state's public higher education systems.305 As
Lieutenant Governor from 2011 to 2019, Newsom was actively engaged with California’s higher
education segments, serving as an ex-officio Board member for both California State University
(CSU) and the University of California (UC) systems.306 By the time he ran for governor,
Newsom’s higher education experience was evident in his postsecondary platform.
Table 2. California Governors and their Party Affiliation since 1959
2019 - present
2011 - 2019
2003 - 2011
1999 - 2004
1991 - 1999
1983 - 1991
1975 - 1983
1967 - 1975
1959 - 1967

Gavin Newsom (D)
Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown (D)
Arnold Schwarzeneggar (R)
Gray Davis (D)
Pete Wilson (R)
George Deukmejian (R)
Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown (D)
Ronald Reagan (R)
Edmund G. “Pat” Brown (D)

Source: California State Library, “Governors’ Gallery,” http://governors.library.ca.gov/list.html
Despite this consistent commitment to education, Brown and Newsom’s specific policy
priorities have varied. The formation of California Community Colleges’ (CCC) 115th college,
Calbright, during Governor Brown’s final term is one such example. Spearheaded by Brown and
taking origin in an early vision he had from his first governorship,307 the initiative was allocated
over $100 million in development funding and an annual budget of $20 million.308 Yet this
“brainchild of a partnership between Governor Brown and Chancellor Oakley,” as one
interviewee dubbed it, lacked support from many Democrats in the Legislature and Governor
Newsom has come across as "sort of lukewarm [about it].”309 In spite of recent Assembly
Higher Education committee calls to “shut that program down completely,” with the argument
that “the money saved 310 can be better used in other places,”311 Newsom has opted to maintain
Calbright, but with approximately $5 million in cuts from the annual budget and $40 million
from previously appropriated funds for the college.312 It is too early to determine the
effectiveness of the 115th California Community College, especially with the promise that
recently appointed Ajita Talwalker Menon brings to its leadership. However, the case of
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Calbright does exemplify how gubernatorial authority and its facilitation of leader-specific policy
formation can lead to fragmentation in the state’s ongoing higher education policy agenda.
Compared to some other states, California governors wield a lot of power over higher education. As
such, variance in gubernatorial approach can have a significant impact on California’s ongoing
higher education performance and policy strategy. Per California constitutional and educational
codes, the governor acts as the final signatory with vetoing power on legislation,313 leads and
enacts state budgeting,314 and makes key appointments to the boards of all three higher
education segments315 and the California Student Aid Commission (CSAC)316 —a process that
two systems leaders we interviewed described as “very political.”317 Apart from these more
formalized powers, Patrick Callan, former president of the National Center for Public Policy
and Higher Education, also observed,
Whatever [the] governor puts in place will probably work fairly well as long as he's
there. Because who's going to go screw up the Governor's initiative? People tend—even
if they don't like it—to go along, to cooperate, to not pick any fights with the governor.
Critiques and praises of specific gubernatorial actions aside, a leader-dependent approach in a
strong governor state like California inhibits development of a long-term, macro-level policy
strategy as well ability to sustain a long-term policy agenda.
Four features of the California political context contribute to a parallel fragmentation in
legislative authority: direct democracy, representative turnover, segmental power, and 'pet
projects.’
Direct Democracy
According to former College Futures Senior Advisor Jane Wellman, direct democracy is rooted
in California’s ballot initiative system and has a "profound influence" on state budget allocations
to education.318 Patrick Callan observed that it “introduces a volatility into public policy that
doesn't necessarily create better things for the public,” and offered the example of Proposition
13 to illustrate how this legislation mechanism can yield policy that addresses short-term public
concerns (e.g., property taxes) while overlooking long-term consequences for the state.
Historically, direct democracy has had stronger financial implications for CCC and K–12
systems than the CSU and the UC; however, as Proposition 209’s 1996 termination of
affirmative action demonstrates,319 direct democracy grants a significant power to the public to
interrupt statewide higher education practice and policy goals across systems.
Term Limits
In 1990, Proposition 140 instituted term limits to the legislature, allowing representatives to
serve a maximum of 6 years in the Assembly, 8 years in the Senate, and 14 years across both
313
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houses.320 Research from the Public Policy Institute of California found that term limits created
“more room for fiscal irresponsibility in the Legislature . . . and less incentive, experience, and
leadership to correct it.”321 While Proposition 28 “relaxed” term limits somewhat,322 it was not
a full return to the days when new legislators were able to take “years learning their trade in
various committees before becoming leaders of their party or chamber.”323
Segmental Influence
Term limit effects on legislative capacity may also have contributed to legislative reliance on
segmental guidance for policy formation, a topic we explore in more detail later in this chapter.
Our interviewees alluded to the issue of higher education systems asserting influence on
legislative action. Colleen Moore, Assistant Director of Education Insights Center, described
the CSU and UC systems as having “a lot of autonomy . . . [and] sway with the legislature about
what we [the systems] need.”324
Pet Projects
Multiple interviews hinted at the influence of individual representatives’ pet issues in higher
education. Among these were categorical spending allocations to CCC, as well as
postsecondary program or campus initiatives. While Student Center Funding Formulas have
improved the issue as it relates to categorical spending,325according to Robert Shireman,
Director of Education Excellence at the Century Foundation, “The politics of opening of
campuses frequently have a lot more to do with personalities in the legislature than they do
with actual demand in the state.”326
In combination, these four features present challenges to developing and implementing a
systematic, continuous approach to statewide higher education policy formation. The salient
manifestation of fragmentation in California’s political domain makes the state more susceptible
to fragmentary postsecondary policy across executive and legislative leadership. In some ways,
higher education policy is trapped in a vicious cycle, where fragmentation simultaneously contributes to
and is caused by a lacking statewide public agenda. Structures that fuel short-term, leader-specific
policy responses require further consideration if the state hopes to meaningfully interrupt this
cycle.
Fragmentation ‘Baked into’ the Higher Education System
In addition to the fragmented nature of policymaking in California, the state’s higher education
system is also fragmented--by design. The central legacy of the Master Plan is its clear
delineation of the roles and purposes of each public segment of higher education, as well as the
320
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role of private not-for-profit colleges and universities. A consequence of this design is that it
limits, and even disincentivizes, cross-segmental collaboration due to the fragmented nature of
decision-making and governance within and across the three segments. Furthermore, there are
no finance mechanisms in place to counteract the resulting silo effects. Segment-level decisionmaking bodies, including governing boards and academic senates, inhibit statewide alignment,
collaboration, and capacity to work toward a public good.
Segment Governing Boards
Each public higher education segment in the state is led by a governing board (see Figure 4, p.
25), which is responsible for building shared governance within its system. This distribution of
powers has “sustained the long-term autonomy of Higher Education in a highly politicized state”
by allowing the segments to more or less regulate themselves.327 For example, the introduction
of the CSU’s Board of Trustees helped alleviate competition among the CSU campuses.328 The
CCC system is distinct in that each of its 115 campuses has its own local board, which further
fragments decision-making.329 This structure was enacted through the 1988 passing of Assembly
Bill 1725 with the aim to make the CCCs more responsible to local communities.330 However,
it also “shift[ed] the power of governance from the legislature to local boards,”331 and increased
the total number of governing bodies across the three systems.
These varying structural arrangements within the segments have historically exacerbated the
complexities underlying each of the segments, limiting capacity for shared decision-making both
across and within systems. These dynamics are further complicated by the power imbalances
across segment boards. Most notably, the UC Board of Regents is particularly powerful, and
comparatively more autonomous than the other two boards given that the state constitution
affords "exclusive power to operate, control, and administer the University of California”332
This creates an unlevel playing field in the few spaces where the three public segments do come
together. Together, these dynamics make California’s postsecondary education approach
“coherent but not coordinated. […] It’s a system model rather than an integrated model,” as
higher education finance expert Jane Wellman suggested.333
Academic Senates
Similar to those in other states, the academic senates of California’s three public segments play
key leadership and decision-making roles in shaping segment-level policy. Whereas the
academic senate of the UC was prescribed by a state charter in 1868,334 the senates of the CSU
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and CCC were introduced in 1963 through an Assembly Concurrent Resolution.335 Segmentwide academic senates are the primary venues for faculty voice in the UC and CSU systems.
Because of their composition, however, these senates are empowered to prioritize narrowlydefined “academic” issues, which can limit the ability of the state to effectively work toward the
public good. As Robert Shireman commented:
While I'm a strong supporter of shared governance, and faculty having a very strong
role, […] it means that when you're negotiating with the Faculty Senate over the next
program you're going to offer, it tends to go in the direction of the more traditionally
academic, and not as much in the direction of “Hey, how could we work really closely
with these local employers to upgrade the skills of their workers, and are there ways
that we could be working more closely with their managers?”—the kinds of things that
could be really creative approaches to training, but are different from the classroom
learning approaches that traditional faculty use.336
Similarly, Michael Kirst, former president of California’s State Board of Education and Professor
Emeritus at Stanford Graduate School of Education, observed:
[The] systems are run by faculty heavily. Very few faculty are interested in adult
education, or new and short-term initiatives for increasing workforce skills . . . And
there isn't any way to really maneuver those traditional systems in a different way. The
community colleges are more malleable [but] UC is independent in many ways from the
legislature. And CSU is a very difficult bureaucracy to move around. It's very ossified.337
This focus on academic issues limits the ability of these bodies to address segment policy as it
relates to larger public needs, such as responding to state or regional workforce needs.
Furthermore, in the few spaces where shared governance is currently possible, the segments
are still oriented to prioritize academic issues of their own segments over a broader statewide
public interest.
In the absence of strong structural arrangements or incentives to align segmental and or state
interests, “the systems go their own ways, negotiating their own deals with the Governor and
Legislature with the whole presumably guided by the invisible hand of the Master Plan."338
Multiple stakeholders we interviewed commented that the current policy environment and
state leadership do not produce a cohesive statewide higher education system. These differing
structural arrangements, and the relative balances of power and autonomy between each
segment and its institutions, leave unresolved the question of whose interests any given
segment should be working towards. Patrick Callan argued:
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I don't want to imply that they're not public spirited—but [the institutions] tend to see
their own interests as the public interest and tend to believe “What's good for General
Motors is good for the country.” And that's probably not entirely a bad thing. That is,
nobody hires the university president to go out and worry about the [public] interest.
Their job is to protect the interests of that institution. And so there needs to be some
offsetting entity that can bring a perspective.
Given the power imbalances between each of three segments of higher education, this lack of a
clearly defined public interest leaves individual systems to set their own agendas and advocate
in competition for limited funding. This also creates logistical differences in the ways that public
policy operates at large. As Dennis Jones, President Emeritus of the National Center for Higher
Education Management System, shared:
Everything is done system-by-system in California, and you’ve got three systems. The
governor sits on the governing board[s], and everything is kind of negotiated between
the state and individual sectors.339
These structural arrangements make unifying around a public interest across, and even within,
segments an uphill battle. One of the strongest sources of evidence for this point is the impact
the fragmentation has on the CCCs and statewide transfer policies. Although establishing clear
transfer pathways was a central goal of the Master Plan, the highly fragmented nature of the
CCC system today has led to establishment of separate, college-level Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) for the Associate Degree to Transfer (ADT) pathways with individual
four-year institutions, leading to “campus-to-campus rather than system-wide course
transferability agreements.”340 Because of the piecemeal nature of MOUs, the transfer
agreements are not consistent, with different courses required for transfer to each campus. As
such, these transfer policies have “led to inefficiencies and low transfer rates,” impeding the
California’s ability to conduct statewide planning related to transfer.341 While the Master Plan
has served as a “treaty” between warring factions,342 it has left unresolved fundamental gaps in
governance. As the state grapples with 21st century challenges cutting across higher education,
workforce, and K–12 preparation, addressing these gaps in governance is critical to achieve
more aligned statewide public policy that attends to differing regional needs.
“Accountable for What?”: Fragmentation in Policy Oversight
When it comes the data for accountability, you have to ask first, '"Accountable for what?” And
California has never stated, “Accountable for what?”
- Dennis Jones, President Emeritus
National Center for Higher Education Management System
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The unresolved tensions between institutional and public interests—as exacerbated by the
fragmentation of both public policymaking at large in the state and the public higher education
sector in particular—are only further compounded by the parallel fragmentation in policy
oversight. Absent statewide attainment goals each segment is left with little incentive or
accountability to work toward a public interest. Similarly, the governor and the state legislature
are working without a shared statewide vision for higher education and are left to prioritize the
policy interests of specific administrations. This historic fragmentation in oversight is a prevailing
feature of the state’s higher education sector and produces structural barriers to creating,
sustaining, and enacting a long-term, stable vision for higher education.
No Statewide Planning or Oversight Body “with teeth”
The state previously had a coordinating body, the California Postsecondary Education
Commission (CPEC); however, it has never had a body with the power to enforce
recommendations or compel system alignment with public goals. While a formal coordinating
body is just one potential lever for enacting a statewide strategy—and we do not argue that a
coordinating body is necessary—the demise of CPEC speaks to historic barriers to organizing
around a statewide public agenda. CPEC’s coordinating or accountability roles were never
much more than a symbolic nod to the coordinating council envisioned in the Master Plan. One
of the key challenges with CPEC was that it lacked the authority to manage conflicts between
segmental governing boards. This is credited as one of the contributing factors behind CPEC’s
eventual downfall. As one policy expert we interviewed reflected:
One of the challenges we had with CPEC is it was told to be a planning agency, but it
didn't have any ultimate authority to trump the decisions of the three boards. And so it
was often considered just too weak to be meaningful. It would do a lot of work, and
then no one would listen to the recommendations it made.343
Governor Brown "axed” CPEC due to its perceived “ineffective[ness],” citing that “there [was]
no shortage of public or private entities that study higher-education policy” in the state.344
Although the state is home to a large number of organizations which provide research-based guidance
to higher education policymakers and leaders, these groups alone are not a sufficient mechanism for
achieving sustained statewide policy leadership that goes beyond any respective gubernatorial or
legislative term. As such, there is no lack of statewide capacity when it comes to these research
and policy organizations in the state implementation of these organizations’ ideas. In the absence
of oversight, the governor is left to use the power of the purse as a lever of control over the
three segments, which further limits the state’s ability to develop a meaningful statewide vision
by promoting more piecemeal policymaking. These dynamics also run the risk of encouraging
the segments to work out their own “deals” with the governor or legislature based on where
they are able to find support for their budget requests, rather than being driven by a set of
overarching public policy prioirities for the state.
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Recognition of the Need for a Public Agenda
There was an overwhelming agreement among those we interviewed that California’s public
higher education system would benefit from greater statewide planning and oversight. At the
same time, there was no shared consensus on what this statewide vision should look like. One
of the central challenges of creating an effective coordinating strategy is that it would need to
effectively advance the public interest in an ecosystem wherein individual segments are
structurally designed to advocate for their own interests. Implicit in this framework is “a kind of
Madisonian checks and balances idea.”345 As Dennis Jones shared, “There are a lot of people in
California and they all recognize the need for a CPEC. But they can't agree what it ought to
do.”346 Such a statewide strategy would also require the governor and legislature to yield some
current power, which presents a significant political hurdle.
Part of the reason for this lack of consensus is that, in a state as large and diverse as California,
there are many distinct "players” in the higher education space. Each of these players has its
own interests and visions for what a statewide approach to higher education should look like.
Jennifer Pacella, Deputy Legislative Analyst at the Legislative Accountability Office, spoke to this
point:
In California, we've had a perennial tension between statewide planning and the power
of the three segments’ governing boards to control their particular segments. On the
one hand, many state policymakers would like to see better statewide planning. Rather
than having a segmental perspective—that is, thinking about the world as UC or the
community colleges see it—they instead would like to take a state approach and ask,
“What does California need from the higher education system? Can we ensure that the
programs being offered across the three segments are those that are most beneficial for
students and employers?” Countering this desire for better statement planning,
however, are the segments’ strong governing boards that have considerable authority
for running their segment. With the administration, the Legislature, and the three
governing boards all in positions of power and each having at least somewhat different
perspectives and priorities, doing statewide planning effectively has been challenging.347
The number of “players” in the higher education space in California speaks to the capacity of
the system. In addition to the higher education and policy leadership in the state, a range of
research, policy, and advocacy organizations in the state work to support the system. Colleen
Moore argued that there is broad buy-in among this latter coalition to establish a coordinating
entity, but the call faces resistance from the segments themselves:
The research, policy, advocacy organizations in higher ed[ucation], are pretty much all
on—as far as I know at the moment--the “pro” side of having a coordinating entity.
Who is on the “anti-” side is the systems themselves. […] Arguably the community
college system has less authority on its own and is more subject to the whims of the
legislature telling them what to do. CSU and especially UC have a lot of autonomy. And
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so, in the absence of any coordinating entity, they have a lot of sway with the
legislature.348
Any such resistance from the segments is reflective of the segmental autonomy afforded by
current structural arrangements. Moving away from those arrangements toward greater
statewide planning would force segments to negotiate a broader statewide, public vision for
higher education, and to be responsive to enacting that public agenda. Establishing such a vision
could align the work of research, policy, and advocacy organizations to more effectively support
higher education policymaking and performance in the state.
Signs of Movement Toward a Public Agenda
With a new governor and fresh leadership across the UC and the CSU, there may be a policy
window to introduce a new, statewide vision for higher education in California. Those we
interviewed highlighted four recent initiatives in the state that reveal signs of more coordinated
activity: (1) CCC’s Vision for Success, UC 2030, & CSU’s Graduation Initiative 2025; (2) the
development of an integrated data system; (3) Governor Newsom’s Council for Postsecondary
Education; and (4) Governor Newsom’s Higher Education Recovery with Equity Taskforce.
Each reflects a potential interest in better aligning policy and practice across systems, while
bearing a unique set of possibilities and limitations.
1. CCC’s Vision for Success, UC 2030, & CSU’s Graduation Initiative 2025. Each of the public
higher education segments have developed a formally articulated vision with operationalizable
goals for the next 5 to 10 years. Though the particular goals within each of these visions vary,
all of are generally focused on increasing degree attainment and closing attainment gaps. For
example, the Vision for Success is the CCC’s “north star,” a guiding document for the community
colleges to achieve their vision of “making sure students from all backgrounds succeed in
reaching their goals and improving their families and communities.”349 Developed through a
rigorous process of soliciting comments from experts and key stakeholders (including written
comments from approximately 550 individuals),350 the Vision for Success was created to identify
goals for the CCC system to work toward by 2022.351 Daisy Gonzales, Deputy Chancellor of
the California Community Colleges, shared more context on the purposes and potential of the
Vision for Success:
Before this [current] Chancellor [Eloy Ortiz Oakley], so before 2016, we had never had
a system wide strategic plan rooted in equity. This Chancellor came in and decided that
he wanted a statewide strategic plan to address historic completion gaps that would
eradicate racial equity gaps in our persistence and completion rates. We convened over
60 different stakeholders in California and multiple Town Halls to collect system input.
It took nine months from the moment that I arrived to create a strategic vision for our
state, and that is the Vision for Success.352
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The resulting document includes tangible goals for the system, akin to the goals represented in
the UC’s 2030 vision and the CSU’s Graduation Initiative 2025. In this way, these segmental
vision documents can establish clear benchmarks that will provide individual campuses, and the
segments as a whole, greater clarity on what they are collectively working toward. These
attempt to build a shared agenda within the otherwise highly fragmented segments and may
present a model for how such benchmarks could be established at a statewide level. For
example, successful system-level stakeholder engagement processes could serve as models for
designing a scaled up, cross-system and cross-sector process to develop a statewide vision for
higher education. Additionally, if a space was created for the segments to work together on a
statewide visionary document, they could then work alongside one another to address regional
needs in a more collaborative effort—taking issues like workforce alignment and transfer
policies head on as a collective.
2. California Cradle-to-Career Data System. Another potential lever for statewide planning and
oversight is the integrated data system the state is working to establish. In 2019, the California
State Legislature passed Assembly Bill 75,353 the California Cradle-to-Career Data System Act,
“which sets out the requirements for the development of a statewide data infrastructure.”354
The state is currently engaged in the design process for the data system, led by the Governor’s
Office and WestEd. Recommendations from these groups will be issued by July 2021 for the
state’s implementation of such a system355 There is hope within the state that this data system
will provide policymakers an additional lever for holding systems accountable, by increasing
transparency in segments’ performance through the provision of longitudinal systemwide data,
which follows students from the “cradle” to their “career’ (i.e., through their whole educational
trajectory). However, those we spoke with also suggested that a data system alone—without a
coordinating body with the power to enforce its systematic use—may be insufficient. Colleen
Moore commented:
Ideally, you would have a data system and you would also have a body that would make
more formalized use of it . . . I still think that if we could get the data system even
without that, there are these fairly well-respected groups that are well resourced and
staffed and have a lot of expertise and pent-up interest in using such a data system to
address questions around ways to improve education policy and practice.356
As Jane Wellman cautioned, the state today does not have an “information problem”357—
rather, the existing research and policy organizations in the state need support in implementing
their own research-based recommendations. As such, questions about “what the system will
look like, how it will be governed, who will have access to data and how privacy and security
will be handled” are currently being discussed by the associated working committees, and will
have major implications for what the data system looks like in practice.358 For example,
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proposals include establishing a new statewide office and governing entity to manage the
system.359 How these decisions shake out will influence the potential of the data system to
support the state’s ability to develop and implement a statewide higher education agenda.
3. Governor Newsom’s Council for Postsecondary Education. There was momentum during fall
2019 with Assembly Bill 130 to reinstate CPEC; however, the bill was ultimately vetoed by
Governor Newsom, despite the fact that he supported the creation of a coordinating body
during his candidacy for governor.360 Instead, Newsom established a new Council for
Postsecondary Education to advise his office on issues related to higher education and “to
enable the various segments of higher education to work more closely and collaboratively
together.”361 The Council includes the president and chancellors of the UC, CSU, and CCCs, as
well as the President of the Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities.362
Also appointed to the Council were representatives from K–12, workforce, and labor
sectors.363 Because the Council has no formal coordinating powers, however, it is unclear
whether it has the capacity to serve as a steward for the state’s higher education needs, or if it
will simply act as a consulting body to the governor. As such, this approach may represent a
means of making the existing system work better, rather addressing underlying issues, such as
fragmentation of governance structures, head on.
4. Governor Newsom’s Higher Education Recovery with Equity Taskforce. Composed of a
diverse set of higher education stakeholders and experts, the taskforce convened by Newsom
in August 2020 is headed by Governor Newsom’s Senior Policy Advisor, Lande Ajose. The
membership of the taskforce includes a number of public and private higher education leaders
in the state, as well as several out-of-state members and representatives from organizations
such as the Institute for Higher Education Policy, the College Futures Foundation, and the
Campaign for College Opportunity.364 According to Education First, the consulting firm
facilitating the taskforce, the group is charged with:
Produc[ing] a roadmap for the state’s education leaders, government, and philanthropic
institutions to ensure that California’s public post-secondary institutions recover from
the impacts of COVID-19 more integrated, equitable, and resilient than before—and
more aligned with the economic needs of the state.365
This taskforce represents a new method to addressing fragmentation in vision and higher
education policy. In particular, Lande Ajose shared that this approach is an attempt “to really
start to talk about what our aligned values are” through the use of “soft power.”366 While the
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taskforce is intended to produce actionable recommendations, questions remain as to whether
its composition, year-end deadline, and limited enforcement capacities position it for success.
Even still, the Taskforce represents a concerted effort from state leadership to engage new
ways to bring the segments together so that the state can be synchronized in its response to
higher education needs during the pandemic, and beyond.
Each of these initiatives and systems illustrates efforts across the state to grapple with the
issues of fragmentation in the higher education policymaking sphere. As Lande Ajose reflected,
“What we need is the political will to take on those things that we know are legitimate
challenges in the system.”367 Without resolving the underlying fragmentation of decisionmaking—within and across institutions—and the policymaking bodies of the state at large, the
same structural barriers to implementing a statewide agenda will likely persist. Tackling these
issues of governance, which are so embedded in the ways higher education policymaking
operates, will not be easy. However, it is necessary if California is to effectively address today’s
higher education challenges.
Negative Outcomes of Fragmentation in Unprecedented Times
Fragmentation in California’s political, segmental, and oversight structures presents challenges
to the development and implementation of long-term, statewide policy strategy for
postsecondary education. Without a cross-sector, cross-term vision, and the accountability
structures to uphold it, policy approaches will likely continue to be piecemeal.
This fragmentation ultimately has serious consequences for California’s students. Fragmentation
in political and legislative approaches influences which student issues get prioritized and funded.
This is especially challenging during economic downturns when resources are scarce, as
evidenced by recent 2020–2021 higher education budget cuts to areas including career and
technical workforce development, food pantries, and programs to support undocumented
students.368 Fragmentation among systems also contributes to and amplifies postsecondary
pathways issues (e.g., K–16 alignment, transfer policies across higher education segments,
statewide student aid policies). Not only is there an ethical imperative to ensure that the
systems and statewide policy cohesively address perennial student equity and access issues,
there is also economic argument for it: misalignment or siloing between the systems prevents
the state from maximizing its human capital and workforce development potential.
Furthermore, fragmentation of segments and political structures can cause inefficiencies in the
prioritization and use of limited financial resources. These consequences are not the fault of
individual leaders but rather a consequence of the highly fragmented structures performing as
they are designed to.
The aforementioned signs of moving toward a public agenda hold promise for mitigating some
of these issues, yet many unknowns remain, given the unprecedented challenges that the state
faces in 2020. Multiple stakeholders we interviewed expressed uncertainty about what this time
portends. Darcie Harvey, a higher education consultant working in California, commented, “I
367
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think [California’s] higher ed[ucation] was not in a great place before this [pandemic]. Even
though there had been good budget years, they were still really facing some problems. And now
they're facing a lot more.”369 There is also the question of how higher education will be
prioritized given the immediate health, environmental, and economic emergencies the state
must address. Higher education has the potential to be a key strategic asset to the state in both
responding to these emergencies in the short-run, and building statewide resilience against such
crises in the future. However, if the issues of fragmentation that we identify are left unresolved,
higher education may have the opposite effect.
Although the governor has not abandoned the higher education reform goals outlined in his
campaign platform, these larger state issues have impacted fiscal and leadership capacity to
follow through on postsecondary promises as originally planned. Yet trials can also act as
catalyzers for change, and perhaps new segmental leadership during this time of transition will
create the conditions for finally addressing perennial, embedded faultlines like fragmentation.
Only time will tell.
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UNCERTAIN AND VOLATILE STATE FUNDING
Pooja R. Patel and Lindsay Adams Van Ostenbridge
x

Volatility in public funding limits the ability of public higher education to address critical
public needs in California.

x

California is especially prone to volatility given its (1) heavy and longstanding reliance on
capital gains tax and (2) constraints on property tax revenues brought about by
Proposition 13.

x

An instability in state revenue creates fluctuations in state fiscal support for higher
education, limiting long-range planning for institutions. Institutions tend to respond by
decreasing access or raising tuition—oU both.

x

In order to maintain access and affordability, California must address systemic problems
that contribute to volatility.

Introduction
Dubbed the budget “balance wheel,” higher education is often the largest discretionary fund in
state budgets that enjoys increased appropriations during prosperous times but
disproportionately large cuts during economic downturns.370 Higher education budgets endure
a proportionally larger cut because institutions have the capacity to generate additional tuition
revenue in a way that agencies such as K–12 and health services do not.371 Both nationally and
in California, COVID-19 will further test the notion of higher education as a balance wheel as
states contend with significant financial upheaval.
Volatility of funding is prevalent in American higher education, starting with state revenues and
appropriations and trickling down to higher education revenues, financial aid, and tuition and
fee levels.372 This analysis defines volatility as an extreme variation and unpredictability of
funding. Volatility is built into the system given that state funding is highly dependent on a
changing economic, tax, and other revenue policies—and tied to states’ long-term structural
budget deficits.373 At the state level, volatility may translate into sharp increases or decreases in
funding across time. Such fluctuations in public funding limit long-range planning for institutions
of higher education by creating uncertainty in their incoming revenue, which may
unintentionally promote volatility in their own expenditures or tuition and fee levels.374
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We identify volatility as a faultline given our observation that such instability in public funding
has limited the ability of public higher education to address critical public needs. While there
are many forces contributing to volatility in California’s revenues and expenditures overall, our
research shows that the state is especially prone to volatility given its (1) heavy and
longstanding reliance on capital gains tax and (2) constraints on property tax revenues brought
about by Proposition 13. This is not to understate other forces that cause volatility in public
budgets, but the combination of the dramatic increases and declines in capital gains tax
revenues (part of the personal income tax) and accompanying constraints of property tax
revenue are pernicious and prevent the state from investing in its future.
Volatile Revenue Trends
According to the Pew Fiscal 50 analysis, California ranks fifth in the nation in tax revenue
volatility.375 State volatility ranking is determined by “both the volatility of individual tax streams
and the share of revenue that each stream represents.”376 While California is not alone in facing
severe blows in revenue due to economic downturns, as Figure 12 demonstrates, California is
more susceptible to changes in tax revenues than the national average, presenting deeper dives
and sharper climbs since the early 2000s.
Figure 12. Change in Tax Revenue California and the United States
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Historically, California has relied on four major sources of revenue: retail and sales tax,
personal income tax, corporate tax, and estate tax. Over the last 70 years, there has been a
decisive shift in the share of the four revenue sources and their contribution to the state
budget.377 Figure 13 shows California's revenue sources from 1951 through 2011 and projected
into 2021. In 1951, 59% of total revenue came from retail sales and use tax while 11% of total
revenue came from personal income tax. By 1991, this revenue pattern had dramatically shifted,
with 35% of the total revenue coming from retail sales and use tax and 45% from personal
income tax. This sharp increase in reliance on personal income tax has continued, and, by 2021,
is expected to make up 67% of total state revenues. Personal income tax revenue is composed
of several income types, ranging from wages and salaries to capital gains tax. Of these
categories, capital gains tax has proved to be most unpredictable, subject to high levels of
fluctuation given its close tie to the stock market. As the share of revenues derived from
personal income tax has increased over the decades, so has California’s reliance on capital gains
tax.
Figure 13. California Revenues by Source, 1951–2021
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Approximately 10% of California's budget is a result of revenues derived from capital gains tax.
Due to its connection with stock market performance, this has meant that, in good economic
times, capital gains revenue tends to be high, and, in bad times, it declines rapidly. Prior to the
Great Recession of 2008, 9% of the state general budget (approximately $9 billion of the $101
billion total general fund tax revenues) was a result of the tax revenue derived from capital
gains taxation. Following the recession in 2009, capital gains dropped by more than half to less
than 5% (or $4 billion of $82 billion). The share of these revenues stabilized to pre-recession
levels at around 10% four years after the recession in 2012.378 The unpredictability and general
volatility in the state budget has had serious implications for state expenditures.
For fiscal year 2021, California projects spending $134 billion as part of general fund
expenditures.379 Figure 14 shows that state expenditures in California have increased steadily
since 1987. Medicaid and elementary and secondary education account for the largest areas of
state spending. Over time, the share of state funding allocated to elementary and secondary
education and Medicaid has also increased substantially. Relative to these, the increases in the
state of higher education funding have been marginal.
Figure 14. California State Expenditures by Function
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As California continues to grapple with the economic fallout from COVID-19, overall state
revenues are down by approximately 21%, and the budget for the current fiscal year (2021)
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faces a $54.3 billion deficit.380,381 This will have serious implications for state higher education
funding—the states’ longstanding balance wheel.
State revenues strongly determine overall fiscal support for higher education in a given year.
Volatility in state revenues results in sharp increases or decreases in state higher education
funding over time. Figure 15 illustrates the annual percent change in state fiscal support
(appropriations and financial aid) for higher education in California compared to the U.S.382 In
fiscal year 2019, there was a 7% increase in state fiscal support for higher education in
California compared to the 5% national average. However, in fiscal year 2009, when states first
felt the true effects of the Great Recession, state fiscal support dropped by approximately 14%
in California but only 4% nationally. These trends further show that good times are exceedingly
beneficial for higher education in California while bad times are especially harsh.
Figure 15. Annual Percent Change in State Fiscal Support for Higher Education
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Given the volatile nature of tax revenue trends in California and its impact on state fiscal
support for higher education, the recession induced by COVID-19 is sure to have negative
consequence for higher education funding in the state. In an interview with Lande Ajose, Senior
Policy Advisor for Higher Education for the Office of the Governor, Ajose noted that prior to
COVID-19, California was anticipating a budget surplus but now faces a deficit of $54 billion for
fiscal year 2021.383 “You know, it’s like whiplash. It’s not just a dream deferred; it feels like dreams
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dashed. Now, having said that, I think the governor is very committed to doing what he can, but
it’s hard to imagine how we’ll be able to do any meaningful investments in the coming year.”384
If the above trends in revenue volatility and the
ensuing volatility in state fiscal support for higher
education continue, California’s colleges and
universities need to brace themselves for a period of
drastic reduction in state education appropriations.
Given the revenue trends during recessions since the
early 2000s, California is looking at a multiyear
recovery period before revenues stabilize to preCOVID-19 levels. This is especially troubling due to
the limits on revenue generation imposed by
Proposition 13.

“California is more dependent on
capital gains than most states
and, as a result, its general fund
revenue volatility is greater than
every other state…the swing is
much greater.”
Jane Wellman
Higher Education Policy Expert

Additional Funding Limitations
Our research posits that California is especially prone to volatility due to the state’s heavy
reliance on income and capital gains taxes. While Proposition 13 and Proposition 98 do not
contribute to the occurrence of volatility in the state per se, Proposition 13 has a noteworthy
impact on revenue generation, and Proposition 98 impacts the level of funding toward K–14
education. In this way, Propositions 13 and 98 impact the severity of volatility. Proposition 13
constrains property tax revenues that could help compensate for lost revenue during turbulent
times, and Proposition 98 establishes a constant guaranteed level of funding to K–14 education,
regardless of California’s economic state.
Prop 13 Imposes Limitations on Property Tax Revenue that Worsen California’s Fiscal Reality
Passed by California voters in 1978, Proposition 13 caps property taxes at 1% of a property’s
assessed value. Each subsequent year, a property’s taxable value is only able to be increased by
the inflation rate or 2%—whichever is lower. Additionally, property taxes are only able to be
reassessed at the sale of a property.385 The Legislative Analyst’s Office noted the dramatic effect
the Proposition had on property tax revenues: In the year after Proposition 13 was approved,
property tax payments dropped by roughly 60%.386 This drop was due to many Californians’
property taxes being decreased; the average property tax rate in California was 2.67% at the
time.387 To help better understand the fiscal impact, Mac Taylor of the Legislative Analyst’s
Office noted that in inflation-adjusted dollars, Proposition 13 reduced California’s cities’ and
counties’ property tax revenues by almost $10 billion in the first year. This limitation on
generating revenue combines with a minimum-funding level in K-14 education to limit available
funds for higher education.
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Prop 98 is an Educational Funding Guarantee that Limits the Amount of Funds to Education
Passed in 1988, Proposition 98 established a minimum annual funding requirement for K–14
education, known as the “minimum guarantee.” While the funding formula for Proposition 98 is
complex, it was established to secure a minimum percentage of monies from the General Fund
and local property tax revenues for K–14 education. However, in practice, it very much
established a minimum funding level, with the government at times needing to tap into funding
sources other than the General Fund to meet the promised amount.388 Joni Finney noted that
while Proposition 98’s “minimum guarantee” was intended to be a funding floor, it has turned
into a funding ceiling over time due to funding volatility.389
In volatility terms, Propositions 13 and 98 are both remarkably stable. However, both propositions
tie the state’s hands, with Proposition 13 structurally limiting revenue, and 98 structurally
guaranteeing a non-negotiable minimum level of funding. A local revenue source, property taxes
represent the second largest source of government revenue for California behind personal
income tax. And while a great amount of income is generated, this revenue pales in comparison
to the amount of revenue there would be without Proposition 13 or with even modest reforms
to property taxes, which could help offset the budget deficits and withstand volatility. In
November 2020, Proposition 15 was a modest attempt at property tax reform. While the
measure did not pass, its aim was to increase funding for public schools, community colleges,
and local government services by changing the tax assessment on commercial and industrial
properties worth over $3 million. With Proposition 15 being voted down, local governments
will not receive the estimated $6.5 to $11.5 billion in additional tax revenue Proposition 15
would have generated that could have helped offset budget deficits.390
Implications of Volatility and College Affordability
Volatility has serious implications for California and impacts higher education access and
affordability. During times of economic downturn, virtually all areas of the state budget face
budgetary cuts; however, higher education is disproportionately affected by budget cuts. The
uneven nature of these cuts puts the higher education sector in a bind.
As demonstrated in Figure 15, California’s institutions have experienced greater instability in
state fiscal support than institutions elsewhere in the nation due to volatility in California’s
revenue stream. This makes state appropriations an unpredictable and unreliable revenue
source for California’s colleges and universities. The inability to rely on consistent state funding
creates great challenges for these institutions. Their ability to plan for the long-term are
affected, and the instability of state support forces institutions to rely on a more predictable
and stable source of revenue: tuition.391 392
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Over the last two decades, inflation-adjusted tuition and fees have soared among institutions in
both the University of California (UC) and California State University (CSU) systems.393 Tuition
(referred to as “fees” in the state) at California’s public universities doubled during the Great
Recession but has only increased by 2.5% at the UC system since 2012 and has not increased at
CSUs, due in part to gubernatorial pressure.394 Regardless, tuition rates are the highest they
have ever been at all three systems in fiscal year 2020–2021: $14,100 at UC395, $5,472 at
CSU,396 and $1,104 at California’s Community Colleges (CCCs).397 Figure 16 shows the
percentage of state appropriations versus net tuition (total tuition and fee revenues minus
state-funded financial aid and institutional discounts) per full-time-equivalent enrollment (FTE)
from 2000 through 2019.398
Figure 16. Share of Revenue from State Appropriations vs. Net Tuition per FTE
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Trends outlined in Figures 15 and 16 reveal a pattern of funding instability for higher education.
When faced with shrinking state fiscal support, higher education responds by decreasing access,
raising tuition, or both. This is seen by an increasing share of net tuition revenue per FTE and
declining enrollments. This causes a ripple effect in the state impacting access and affordability
for students and families—and puts an increased strain on the state’s financial aid system.
The Cal Grant is the largest state financial aid (grant) program, and its benefits allow at least
half of students enrolled in California’s three public segments to pay no tuition. Because Cal
Grant awards are indexed to tuition, when tuition rises, the state’s contribution to Cal Grant
rises as well. Additionally, despite substantial state contribution, there are students who are
eligible for Cal Grant but who do not receive it due to its stringent criteria and limited
availability.399,400 Policymakers in the state are currently modernizing the Cal Grant program to
remove eligibility barriers based on age, time out of high school, and GPA.401
While California has done an admirable job in maintaining its commitment to state financial aid,
volatility in state funding has limited state appropriations to higher education and caused tuition
to partly make up for lost revenue.402 As Figure 16 outlines, the student and family share of
higher education revenues increases rapidly during periods of economic recession—at a time
when people can least afford it.403 When the economy stabilizes, a new level is established. As
such, the goal post keeps moving as students and families are saddled with providing a higher
and higher portion of revenues for higher education.
While the median household income in California is higher than the national average ($78,105
vs. $68,703), as noted in the Disparities chapter of this report, median income data mask the
true reality of income inequality and persistent wealth gaps in California. Issues around college
affordability are persistent. In a report examining attainment growth, the National Center for
Higher Education Management Systems gave California an F on affordability for low-income
students.404 A California student attending college requires 16% of family income on average to
attend a public two-year college, 20% to attend a public four-year nondoctoral institution, and
27% to attend a public research institution.405 So, even if a student can access higher education,
they may not be able to afford it.
In California, issues around volatility and fragmentation in governance (as identified in the
Fragmentation chapter of this report) make the state less able to respond during fiscal crises,
which in turn leads to the likelihood of further financial cuts to higher education, and thus
perpetuating “an ongoing cycle of decline.”406 In order to break this cycle, California must
399
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address the systemic structures that make state funding volatile, because shifting the burden of
cost to students and families is not a sustainable strategy for predictable higher education
funding.
Conclusion and Policy Considerations
Intentionally or not, California has made itself susceptible to volatility. A heavy reliance on a
volatile source of revenue combined with limitations imposed on property tax revenues by
Proposition 13 has created the perfect storm to exacerbate uncertainty and volatility in state
funding. Uncertainty in the state budget has been detrimental to higher education because
fluctuations in public funding limit long-range planning for institutions. In light of such
unpredictability in state revenue levels, institutions have come to increasingly rely on tuition
revenue. This shift in revenue sources has left students and families to bear a greater cost
burden of higher education.
Figure 17. The Shifting Burden of Cost
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While COVID-19 is having a deep financial impact on California, it is simply a shock to a system
that was already very volatile given its heavy reliance on a source of funding subject to extreme
highs and severe lows. If the current state of revenue generation continues, higher education
will undoubtedly face more uncertainty in the years to come. The ongoing financial crisis is sure
to have a lasting impact on California and its higher education system. In discussing the potential
financial effects of COVID-19, Jane Wellman noted the significance of these impacts on higher
education: “…undoubtedly [higher education] is going to face budget cuts, whether it’s also
tuition increases or closures of institutions, who knows?—the past is unlikely to be the
prologue because this is probably going to be a longer and deeper disruption than we’ve seen,
even possibly since the Great Recession.”407
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Joni E. Finney & Taylor K. Odle
California’s future prosperity and civic wellbeing rests on its ability to educate far more diverse
learners, yet the state faces serious and deep educational disparities in terms of race,
socioeconomic status, and region of the state. The individual benefits from postsecondary
education in terms of employment opportunities and achieving some prospect of economic
mobility vary greatly by these factors, as described earlier in this report and documented in
numerous statewide reports.
The once highly regarded California Master Plan for Higher Education (1960–1975) was a public
policy blueprint supported by Governor Pat Brown and developed by UC President Clark Kerr
through a process of compromise and consultation. Most importantly, it addressed the large
tidal wave of students entering higher education in the latter half of the 20th century and
provided both structural and finance policies that ensured a clear delineation of responsibilities
and roles among its three newly established segments of higher education. It also provided for
need-based student financial aid and included the not-for-profit independent sector in serving
public purposes. The Master Plan’s forward-thinking approach provided California with the
motivation and leadership, both state and institutional, to expand its higher education system
for Californians who would benefit from postsecondary education for the next few decades.
The California Master Plan allowed for the orderly growth of higher education and allowed the
state to address the twin goals of meritocracy and access, as they were understood by leaders
at the time. It was studied internationally and set the bar for many states as they planned the
growth for their systems of higher education. Several subsequent reviews of the Master Plan,
roughly every ten years, reinforced its basic structure, even while California was experiencing
rapid demographic, economic, and social change. Yet important aspects of the plan have fallen
by the wayside (e.g., location of campuses based on demographic growth, affordable fees, etc.)
while the state is left primarily with a structure that is no longer suited for the needs of the
21st century. It also abandoned any attempt to coordinate the work among the systems to
ensure that public purposes were being met.
California’s disparities in higher education performance must be tackled within an increasingly
fractured political environment characterized by conflicting voter referenda, sharp regional
ideologies, limits on legislative authority, longer-term structural budget deficits, and wild swings
in state revenue. These disparities must also be addressed within a public policy infrastructure
lacking long-term state policy stewardship for higher education, which has instead operated as a
series of gubernatorial compacts that lasted until the next inevitable recession. These actions
have solidified the historical higher education silos and the public finance policies that reinforce
the very disparities that should be ameliorated. Recent efforts by Governor Newsom, following
previous ones by Governor Brown, are inadequate in their ability to go beyond the 1960
California Master Plan for higher education. The state’s issues transcend individual leaders and
are structural in nature, resulting from decades of chronic inattention to the faultlines outlined
in this report. We believe that the good institutional practices and segment initiatives are
noteworthy but not strong enough to address the deep divides in educational and lifetime
outcomes for a growing portion of Californians.
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Educational disparities place California on the precipice of a public policy crisis in higher
education. The three public segments and their individual institutions are delivering the results
that state leaders want, but not what California needs. The public policies that form the
backbone of this structure are not only in need of reform but also require sustained attention
in the years to come. Retrofitting a mature system of higher education will not be an easy or
short-term process. This process is one that can be fraught with political difficulty, but a new
blueprint is possible to guide the state for the next few decades as it reduces educational
disparities and their associated lifetime outcomes.
We make these recommendations recognizing the serious public policy challenges consuming
California elected officials, including the ravaging effects of climate change, the growing
problems of homelessness, and the pandemic and its associated economic recession. Higher
education has not only proven to be a strategic asset for states when addressing workforce
competitiveness and individual opportunity, but California’s higher education sector could also
be leveraged to help deal with these other issues. It is for these very reasons that Governor
Newsom should rely on a statewide Blue Ribbon Commission to help him retrofit higher
education in the decades beyond his own term in office.
The following recommendations, we believe, can place California on a trajectory toward
recreating a system of higher education that can both meet the needs of contemporary life and
truly earn California the often-claimed mantra as “best in the world.”
Recommendations
Reducing and eliminating gaps in performance must be the primary and substantive statewide
policy agenda for California higher education. This agenda should be inclusive of gaps related to
race, socioeconomic status, and region.
Many California leaders we spoke with were reluctant to follow the path of other states in
establishing numerical goals for educational attainment. Many see them as unrealistic or not
helpful and imposed by outside entities. Whether the state establishes educational attainment
goals or not, understanding how the state performs in higher education on behalf of Californians
in closing persistent and obstinate gaps is the only way that state government is accountable to
Californians for establishing a fair playing field for educational opportunity and its associated
benefits. Further, reporting to the public on these outcomes and actions taken to reduce
disparity is a central responsibility of state government. To date, California’s higher education
performance falls well below the level required of its diverse populous and rapidly developing
workforce. While some progress has been made to reduce disparities along dimensions of race,
socioeconomic status, and region, large gaps still remain that are likely to become harder—not
easier—to ameliorate given the state’s fragmented policy and governance structure and
increasing volatility in public funds for higher education. This reality means that Californians’
futures are strongly determined by their race, socioeconomic status, and region from birth.
Eliminating this predetermination must be a central aim of California’s higher education sector.
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The governor, with input from legislative leadership, should establish a statewide Blue Ribbon
Commission representative of California’s stakeholders in higher education. Business leaders,
leaders of major advocacy groups, regional representation, and educational leaders should
comprise this Commission.
The Commission’s substantive charge should be to comprehensively address a public agenda to
reduce the disparities in performance described in this report. A public agenda is long term
strategy for higher education that plans for the next generation of students and the institutions
that serve them. The Commission should comprehensively examine alternative statewide
governance, funding, and accountability policies that can be used to reduce disparities and link
higher education to individual opportunity and workforce needs. The Commission should draw
on the work of both the Governor’s Task Force on Business and Jobs Recovery and the new
California Higher Education Recovery with Equity Taskforce. While this latter initiative of
Governor Newsom is critically important, it does not go far enough in the scope of its work. A
taskforce that does not consider the structural and financial inequities that reinforce disparity in
higher education outcomes will naturally be limited in its impact. The existing higher education
taskforce’s membership is notable in that its membership consists of innovative leaders who
understand best practices nationwide, yet its limitation is that it appears to try to solve the
problems confronting higher education within the very structure and finance mechanisms that
reinforce disparities. The work of the proposed Commission should be staffed by full-time
professionals, and its chair(s) should work to gather input from a broad group of stakeholders
who depend on the future of California higher education, including business leaders, leaders of
major advocacy organizations, leading California citizens from all regions of the state, and
national policy experts.
The critical need is to develop a model for statewide stewardship of higher education that
reduces educational disparities by race, socioeconomic status, and place. The chronic lack of
public policy priorities and a long-term mechanism to address them compounds these issues. The
goodwill among all relatively new public higher education segment heads is optimistic but is still
not a substitute for a statewide commitment and sustained public stewardship for this strategic
asset the state can use to address myriad problems.
The agenda for the Blue Ribbon Commission should:
Establish regional education systems, governed regionally, to improve educational opportunities
and reduce educational disparities.
As detailed in this report, educational and economic opportunities for Californians are sharply
determined by where they live, and the state’s growing regions—which concentrates
demographic, economic, and educational inequities within diverse geographic bounds. Today’s
educational disparities are too wide and deep to be resolved within the existing silos of higher
education. These structures discourage a smooth transition of students from high school to
postsecondary education, from community colleges to comprehensive or research universities,
and ultimately from higher education to the workforce. Most students transfer from their local
community college to their local university. Many are employed in the local region in which they
were educated and lived. The siloed approach also underutilizes the state’s independent
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colleges and universities can assist in addressing these regional educational disparities. If
reducing disparity accounted for regional contexts and considered the use of state and regional
resources, it is likely California would make progress on an agenda to close gaps between
groups.
No map exists to identify specific regions that would be organized across the higher education
sectors and link to (or develop) workforce opportunities of the region. This work should be
undertaken by the Blue Ribbon Commission. While a more regional approach to higher
education may result in the perception of further fragmentation at a macro level, bringing
diverse stakeholders and state resources together at a more local level—regardless of current
“system” membership—provides for a much more cohesive higher education–workforce
ecosystem and allows each partner to tailor its approach and activities given the needs within
each region. At the same time, however, the state must also simultaneously develop a
mechanism for the sustained public stewardship of higher education, including policies to
support the work of regional activities, particularly in the areas of finance and accountability.
Without both components (regional education systems and a sustained public stewardship
mechanism), it is likely that educational gaps will persist, and California will continue to
underperform in higher education.
A charge to the Blue Ribbon Commission should be to undertake such a study in terms of
thinking through a regionally reflective and regionally responsive strategy. An understanding of
any constitutional limitations and opportunities to address this agenda would be necessary, but
the Commission must find a way to reduce the fragmentation within higher education and take
into account regional educational needs in order to close educational disparities in the state.
The state is not without a host of both traditional and creative options to address its problems
as it works to repair its fragmented structures or to design new ones, but its will to use these
options will ultimately determine if the state is able to reduce these disparities.
Any new systems of higher education based on regions of the state must have a strategy to
ensure that statewide needs are met and that gaps in educational opportunities are addressed.
While we do not have a specific recommendation about how the state establishes regional
education systems, the plan must also allow for the development of public finance policies and
policies that hold regions accountable in a publicly transparent way for reducing gaps in
disparities of opportunity by race, socioeconomic status, and region of the state.
Consider the public finance principles to guide a statewide strategy to reduce educational
disparities.
Commission members must be engaged with other leaders in California in an ongoing
conversation about the fiscal health of the state and its education systems. To the extent that
the state is considering changes to tax policy, rainy day funds, public pensions, ballot initiatives
that influence education funding, or other similar matters, top civic and business leaders in the
state must intentionally consider the impact of changes for higher education. If higher education
remains the “balance wheel” of state budgets, this strategic state asset is unlikely to reduce
disparities and workforce opportunities. The present insensitivity to these realities has
compounded the volatile nature of education appropriations in the state and led to rapidly
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escalating yet unpredictable college prices, realities that not only have real impacts on the
state’s financial aid programs but also on families’ budgets.
We realize that it is unrealistic to completely insulate higher education from the swings in the
economy, but steps can and should be taken to minimize its influence in its role as a “budget
balancer.” For example, during difficult times some states have dedicated tax revenues for
higher education to draw on in economic downturns and developed a higher education rainy
day fund from general tax revenue. At the same time, commission members can and should
expect productivity improvements from higher education. Many options for productivity can be
explored for different types of institutions. Even within each of the three existing segments,
there is a fairly wide range of productivity outcomes related to their missions; these
productivity issues are not limited only to undergraduate education but apply to graduate
education and research competitiveness as well.
In addition to considering the broad public finance issues of California, commission members
must consider how the state uses its funding for higher education. State appropriations for
institutional operations, state need-based financial aid, and tuition policies must be taken into
account and must be developed in concert to support regional systems in reducing educational
disparities. The public finance of California higher education currently reinforces these
disparities by providing significantly more resources per student to those who are already most
advantaged educationally, with students from higher income families, for example, receiving the
largest state subsidies for their education—a feature that is “baked into” the finance policies of
each public system. Further, while per-student support varies widely from the state’s
community colleges to its research universities, the current subsidization process is not
designed to improve student outcomes and reduce educational disparities. Rather, research
universities receive such premiums for the research they undertake. While institutional
appropriations for the research universities far exceed per-student funding for the
comprehensive and community college sectors, these latter two groups will bear the lion’s
share of work to educate the state’s rapidly diversifying population. Progress to reduce
disparities is nearly impossible under the current financing policies, yet the state must examine
how its funding is structured and what incentives the state wants to provide—and what
behaviors it wants to reward.
Since it is possible that public funding on a per-student basis will not return to pre-recession
levels any time soon, if ever, it means that the state must seriously consider how to fund
research, as a great deal of funding is directed for research. Currently, the per student subsidy
provides a much lower teaching load at the University of California than the per student
subsidy at California State University or the Community Colleges. This is a public subsidy for
research, and it treats all UC faculty the same, regardless of individual productivity or priority
research needed by the state in the areas of climate change, homelessness, health care or for
other important public problems. We are not suggesting that the state stop subsidizing research
but rather encouraging the state to consider ways it might prioritize the most productive and
promising research programs and how research can address critical priorities in the state.
Reducing educational disparities inevitably requires rethinking state priorities for higher
education and carefully targeting funding to the colleges and universities that serve most
California students.
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For students and families, the state’s highly regarded Cal Grant program should also come
under scrutiny by commission members. The fiscal limitation of scholarships for eligible
students, and the further limitation of Cal Grants for tuition payments rather than for total
educational costs, undermines the impact the program could have in reducing educational
disparities and reinforces inequalities for students along regional and socioeconomic lines. In
this regard, tuition must be another agenda item for the commission. Students and families,
particularly in times of recession or slow economic growth, pay a growing portion of family
income for tuition, room and board, and mandatory fees. These increased educational costs
also reinforce existing disparities and even further separate students from equal access to
educational and economic opportunity along dimensions of race/ethnicity, socioeconomic
status, and region.
Establish a system of public accountability to monitor regional efforts to address educational
disparities.
Reporting publicly on how state dollars are spent and on progress in reducing educational
disparities is a central role of state government. There appears to be political commitment to
build a statewide student unit database to systematically track students in the state from K-12
through higher education and into the workforce. Many advocates see the development of such
a database as necessary for monitoring California’s progress, even absent a mechanism for state
policy stewardship that would use such a database for decision making. While a state
longitudinal data system may help with systematic tracking of students, it cannot substitute for
statewide leadership for closing gaps in disparities in educational outcomes and their benefits.
Who will track and report on these data? Who will evaluate California’s new programs? Who
will have the authority to wield this knowledge to make meaningful change for Californians? It is
likely that the fragmented structure of the higher education sector—between systems, the
workforce, and the California Student Aid Commission—would make the implementation of
such a database particularly complex given its expected payoffs. However, any decisions about
the database should fall to a newly formed body that would provide the long-term public
stewardship for higher education in the state.
Establish a mechanism for sustained state policy leadership for California Higher Education.
California lacks a long-term policy process, or mechanism to serve as a public steward of higher
education policies, including the collection of any data related to this agenda. The public
stewardship for the next generation of Californians cannot be accomplished by short-term state
compacts or taskforces or within gubernatorial or legislative terms. We also do not believe it
can be accomplished by regular meetings of system heads, as valuable as they might be. Leaders
will come and go, but policies must be put into place that ensures that the disparities in higher
education be ameliorated. This report suggests that regionally governed systems supported
through strong finance and accountability policies are the way forward. Having said this, an
entity or entities must represent the state and public interests in overseeing this agenda. States
have different ways to provide for the public stewardship of higher education, and California
may learn from some aspects of these models. There is no one right model for all states. The
model for California will be one that ensures that the public interests are paramount in the

“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA

77

public discourse of higher education and that the public policies adopted will provide for
individual opportunity and workforce options for all students who enter some form of
postsecondary education.
Conclusion
California’s rich history of establishing a system of higher education to serve public needs is
indeed notable. This success should not deter state leaders from asking questions about the
long-term future of higher education for the state. Too much is at stake for the state to rest on
its past success. State leaders, particularly elected officials, owe all Californians the
opportunities presented by our new economy and culture, just as Governor Pat Brown and
Clark Kerr understood their public responsibilities to the people of the state in 1960. These
leaders did not follow a blueprint, as one was not available to them. They invented the future of
higher education. The call to action is no less urgent for today’s leaders. We have confidence
that if elected officials understand higher education as one of the most important strategic
assets at the state’s disposal, they can act. If they fall into the hubris of the “best in the world”
moniker, little is likely to change, and the futures of many Californians may not be brighter due
to the significant disparities in individual opportunity for its diverse population. In a very real
sense, as one of the policy thought leaders that we interviewed reminded us, “this is a demand
side problem;” the demand for a better future must come from state leaders. The state must
provide for the sustained public stewardship for this valuable asset and how it responds to
individual and state needs in the future. Millions of lives across a diverse, vibrant, and new
California depend on it.
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